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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Corbett S. Gottfried for the 
Master of Arts in History presented October 24, 1995. 
Title: U.S. Military Intelligence in Mexico, 1917-1927: 
An Analysis. 
The Military Intelligence Division (MID) was the U.S. 
Army's intelligence agency that reported to the Chief of 
Staff within the War Department. During the years 1917-
1927, the MID routinely conducted surveillance of Mexico, 
including: espionage, mail censorship, radio intercepts, 
intelligence gathering, and development of plans for the 
invasion of Mexico. 
This study utilizes a tripartite model to evaluate 
the production and analysis of military "intelligence" by 
the MID in Mexico during the period 1917-1927. First, the 
organization and development of the Military Intelligence 
Division from its origins in 1885 through the year 1927 is 
explored with sections on institutional history and objects 
of investigation. Second, a quantitative analysis of 
intelligence documents identifies the focus and priorities 
of the MID in Mexico. Third, a textual analysis of 
intelligence documents makes use of a cross-cultural 
framework to demonstrate the prevailing attitudes, 
perspectives and world views of the MID toward the Mexican 
state and its peoples. 
2 
The thesis question as to whether the U.S. Military 
Intelligence Division created an accurate and complete 
picture of "reality" of Mexico is answered in the negative. 
The MID perspective was colored by cultural bias, 
ignorance, and misunderstanding. Ultimately, the MID 
failed to grasp the reality of Mexico because it failed to 
ask the right questions. It seriously misunderstood the 
nature of Mexico and its peoples, especially in its 
relationship with the United States .. 
The particular model developed for this study lends 
itself to the possibility of further research in the area 
of international history and cross-cultural studies. The 
use of multiple analysis techniques provides a more 
comprehensive picture of the various factors involved that 
influence historical events. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the intelligence 
gathering and surveillance activities of the U.S. Military 
Intelligence Division (MID) in relation to Mexico during 
the years 1917-1927. The Military Intelligence Division 
was the U.S. Army's intelligence agency that reported to 
the Chief of Staff within the War Department. Throughout 
the time period in question, the MID routinely conducted 
surveillance of Mexico, gathered military intelligence on 
Mexico, developed plans for the invasion of Mexico, 
conducted espionage activities in Mexico, intercepted 
Mexican diplomatic radio transmissions, and conducted 
censorship of the mail crossing the U.S.-Mexican border. 
In addition to the actual historical events, this 
researcher is interested in the attitudes and perceptions 
of the Military Intelligence Division as manifested in its 
intelligence gathering and surveillance of Mexico. This 
study shows how the production and analysis of military 
"intelligence" helped to create a "Mexican reality" that 
became the truth for the MID. This truth was then passed 
on to policy-makers in Washington, D.C., including the 
State Department and the President of the United States, 
and was used to assist in the formulation of policy and in 
the decision-making process in regards to Mexico. 
In order to analyze the attitudes and perceptions of 
the Military Intelligence Division, as well as to examine 
the reality of Mexico, it is necessary to take a cultural 
approach in addressing the issues. Unfortunately, 
according to Akira Iriye, "there is no definition of 
culture that is completely satisfactory for the study of 
international affairs." 1 However, for purposes of this 
study, I will use Iriye's definition of culture: 
culture in the study of international relations 
may be defined as the sharing and transmitting of 
consciousness within and across national boundaries, 
and the cultural approach as a perspective that pays 
particular attention to this phenomenon. 2 
Iriye goes on to explain that culture includes the 
"creation and communication of memory, ideology, emotions, 
life styles, scholarly and artistic works, and other 
symbols. 113 
2 
In terms of the cultural approach, this study is also 
informed by the scholarly work of Edward Said. Although 
1Akira Iriye, "Culture and International History," 
in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 
ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 214-215. Iriye also 
explains that there is no "good theoretical work that 
serves as the point of departure for the application of the 
concept of culture to diplomatic history." See also Frank 
Ninkovich, "Interests and Discourse in Diplomatic History," 
Diplomatic History 13 (Spring 1989): 135-161. 
2Ibid. I 215. 
3Ibid. I 
3 
Said's interest is in the concept of "Orientalism," many of 
his findings regarding culture can be applied to the 
relationship between Mexico and the United States. 
According to Said: 
Culture, of course, is to be found operating within 
civil society, where the influence of ideas, of 
institutions, and of other persons works not through 
domination but by what Gramsci calls consent. In any 
society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural 
forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas 
are more influential than others; the form of this 
cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as 
hegemony, an indispensable concept for any 
understanding of cultural life in the industrial 
West .... it can be argued that the major component in 
European culture is precisely what made that culture 
hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of 
European identity as a superior one in comparison 
with all the non-European peoples and cultures. 4 
Even today, according to Said, "standardization and 
cultural stereotyping" of the Orient continues. 5 I would 
argue that the same holds true for the American view of 
Mexico. 
In their study, American Cultural Patterns, Edward 
Stewart and Milton Bennett define the term American as 
meaning "citizen of the United States of America." For 
purposes of this study, I will use the same definition. 
Stewart and Bennett define the term American culture as the 
4Edward w. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1978), 7. Said also explains that "there is in 
addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, 
themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental 
backwardness, usually overriding the possibility that a 
more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had 
different views on the matter." 
5Ibid. I 26. 
"dominant patterns of thinking and behaving of mainstream 
Americans, composed primarily, but not exc.lusively, of 
members of the white, male middle class. 116 I will also 
utilize the same definition when referring to American 
culture. 
The above mentioned works of Akira Iriye, Edward 
Said, Edward Stewart and Milton Bennett are used as the 
intellectual underpinning to develop the theoretical 
framework or construct to inform this study. Thus, this 
study seeks to develop a cross-cultural model to analyze 
the international relationship between the United States 
and Mexico as seen through the eyes of the U.S. Military 
Intelligence Division. According to Stewart and Bennett: 
The core difficulty in cross-cultural interaction 
is - simply stated - a failure to recognize relevant 
cultural differences. Because of superficial 
stereotyping and the belief that one's own values 
and behaviors are natural and universal, Americans 
(and others) at home or abroad often fail to grasp 
the social dynamic that separates them from their 
associates. 7 
The American perspective during the period 1917-1927 
encouraged the expansion of American culture, trade, and 
4 
investment. In fact, "The 1920s were the most economically 
expansionist decade in American history (until the 1960s), 
and Republicans like Hoover encouraged this private 
6Edward c. Stewart and Milton J. Bennett, American 
Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, (Yarmouth, 
Maine: Intercultural Press, 1991), xii. 
7Ibid., 6. 
internationalist impulse." 8 It is also argued that 
"international relations during the 1920s may be said to 
have been characterized as much by cultural as by military 
or economic affairs." 9 
The U.S. military, specifically the Military 
Intelligence Division, reflected the prevailing attitudes 
and cultural bias of the American public. It is the 
contention of this researcher that the results of this 
study will show that an unique U.S. cultural orientation 
and ethnocentrism hampered the effectiveness and accuracy 
of military intelligence in relation to Mexico. In fact, 
the Military Intelligence Division failed to grasp the 
5 
significance of what was taking place in Mexico during this 
time. As a result of this, I would argue that the MID was 
actually incapable at this time of truly educating American 
officials concerning the "reality" of Mexico. Without an 
I 
accurate intelligence picture of Mexico, American officials 
had no solid basis nor frame of reference on which to base 
their attitudes and perceptions. 
The thesis question raised in this study is the 
following: Was the reality of Mexico as perceived and 
viewed through the eyes of the U.S. Military Intelligence 
Division accurate and complete? 
8Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: 
American Economic and Cultural Ex;pansion. 1890-1945, (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 140. 
9Iriye, "Culture and International History," 224. 
6 
Four questions that inform the thesis question are 
raised in this study. First, what constitutes 
"intelligence" in the context of the Military Intelligence 
Division in Mexico during the period of 1917-1927? Second, 
what were the priorities of the MID in relation to Mexico 
during this time? Third, what were the attitudes and 
perceptions of the MID toward Mexico during this time? And 
fourth, how did cultural differences color the military 
intelligence analysis of Mexico? 
This study makes use of three different methods or 
techniques to address the thesis question and its related 
secondary questions. The three methods include: a 
historical overview, a quantitative analysis, and a textual 
(literary) analysis. The three methods are described in 
detail below. 
Chapter II provides a historical overview of the 
organization and development of the Military Intelligence 
Division from its origins in 1885 through the year 1927. 
An institutional history focuses on the activities of the 
MID in Mexico, as well as providing general background 
information. Particular attention is paid to 
organizational issues, intelligence gathering, intelligence 
production or analysis, personnel selection, training, and 
reporting techniques. The sections on objects of 
investigation include extracts from selected intelligence 
reports that speak on various topics, such as: rebel 
activities, radical movements, military intervention, 
economic conditions, politics, and Japanese activities in 
Mexico. 
Chapter III includes the quantitative analysis 
portion of this study. The intent of the quantitative 
analysis is to identify and tabulate the various topic 
categories contained within the selected military 
intelligence reports. The frequency and percentage of the 
various topic categories are tabulated for three different 
time periods: 1917-1918, 1919-1920, and 1921-1927. 
The following primary sources were used for the 
quantitative analysis: 1) Richard Challener's thirty 
volume collection containing twenty-six volumes of weekly 
intelligence summaries and four volumes of daily summaries 
for the period 1917-1927; 2) Dale Reynolds' microfilm 
collection containing approximately 9,000 pages of 
documents for the period 1919-1941; and 3) a sample of 
documents from the National Archives in Washington, D.C., 
selected by this researcher. All documents are military 
intelligence reports contained in the National Archives, 
specifically Record Group 165, war Department General 
Staff, Military Intelligence Division. 
The sample drawn for this quantitative analysis 
utilized all 254 weekly and thirty-nine daily summaries 
(100%) relating to Mexico contained within the Challener 
collection covering the years 1917-1927; 182 out of a 
7 
possible 272 documents (67%) covering the years 1919-1927 
contained in the Reynolds' collection; and seventy-six 
documents selected from the National Archives covering the 
years 1917-1924. Thus, the comprehensive sample drawn for 
this study reflects a plausible and systematic approach 
toward securing a representative sample of documents. The 
number of documents selected from the microfilm collection 
and the National Archives was limited due to time 
constraints, access to archive materials, readability of 
microfilm records, and cost considerations. The intent of 
this study is to provide a model of analysis that can be 
used by other researchers for more extensive studies. 
8 
The purpose of this quantitative analysis is to 
identify the focus and priorities of the Military 
Intelligence Division relative to Mexico during the years 
1917-1927, by calculating the amount of coverage given to 
various topics (military operations, politics, economics, 
foreign relations) . Although limited in scope (MID records 
in the National Archives are extensive) , the results of 
this quantitative analysis should serve as a fair indicator 
of the emphasis placed by the MID on various components of 
its surveillance of Mexico. The documents, records, and 
reports generated by the MID helped to shape and define the 
U.S. government's perspective or concept of the reality of 
Mexico. 
Chapter IV contains the textual (or literary) 
9 
analysis portion of this study. I am using the term 
"textual" rather than "literary" because the source 
material involves intelligence reports and documents rather 
than works of literature. However, the methodology is the 
same. The methodology employed in this study includes the 
identification of themes, discussion, and the support of 
conclusions through the use of examples. 
The textual analysis used in this study is performed 
on selected documents used in the quantitative analysis 
portion of the study. The textual analysis makes use of 
the Stewart and Bennett framework for cross-cultural 
perspectives by analyzing the language used in selected 
intelligence reports. I believe that through the use of 
this technique I am able to demonstrate more clearly the 
prevailing attitudes, perspectives, and world views of the 
Military Intelligence Division toward the Mexican state and 
its peoples. It should become more evident that the 
ethnocentrism of the MID got in the way of painting an 
accurate portrait of the reality of Mexico during the years 
from 1917 to 1927. 
The conclusions drawn in Chapter v reflect the 
findings of this tripartite model of analysis, as well as 
addressing the thesis question itself. In addition, there 
is a section that provides implications for further study. 
The value of an interdisciplinary approach toward the study 
of international history is also demonstrated. 
CHAPTER II 
U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN MEXICO: 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 
Although various military intelligence activities can 
be traced back to the founding of the United States, it was 
not until 1885 that the War Department created a separate 
army office with specific responsibility for military 
intelligence. According to Colonel Marc B. Powe, USA,: 
The immediate cause was a request for information 
on a foreign army from the secretary of war. The 
adjutant general, R.C. Drum, had to report not 
only that he did not have the information, but also 
that there was no effective system for obtaining 
it. Shortly thereafter, the Military Information 
Division (MID), Miscellaneous Branch, the Adjutant 
General's Office, was established with the general 
mission of collecting "information concerning the 
coast defenses and interior topography of the 
harbors of Central America, New Mexico, Cuba, 
Canada, and probably one or two other countries." 1 
When it was created, the Military Information Division 
1Marc B. Powe, "A Sketch of a Man and His Times," in 
The Final Memoranda: Major General Ralph H. Van Deman. USA 
Ret .. 1865-1952: Father of U.S. Military Intelligence, ed. 
Ralph E. Weber (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988), ix. 
The official history of the MID is contained in Bruce W. 
Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division. 
Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941 (Frederick, 
MD: University Publications of America, 1986). Also see 
Marc B. Powe, The Emergence of the war Department 
Intelligence Agency: 1885-1918 (Manhattan, KS: Military 
Affairs, 1975). 
consisted of one officer, one civilian intelligence 
analyst, two assistants and a messenger. The entire 
operation was situated in a single room. 2 
11 
Not surprising, war brought about an expansion of the 
organization. The Spanish-American War of 1898 saw the MID 
increase to "eleven officers, ten clerks, two messengers, 
two rooms, and a budget of $3,640." The work of the 
central MID office was "supplemented by some forty National 
Guard units across the country." 3 
Fortunes shifted again and by 1908, the Military 
Information Division "had disappeared as a separate entity, 
having been relegated to committee status within the newly 
created war College Division." The situation did not 
significantly change with the 1911 reorganization of the 
general staff because "the war College continued to be 
responsible for the collection and dissemination of all 
military intelligence." 4 
The issue at this point in time was the analysis (or 
lack thereof) of the intelligence that was gathered. As 
one historian explains: 
Information was being collected, primarily by the 
military attaches at American embassies around the 
world who routinely sent messages to Washington. 
2Roy Talbert, Jr., Negative Intelligence: The Army and 
~American Left. 1917-1941 (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1991), 3. 
3Ibid., 3-4. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
At the receiving end, however, nothing happened to 
the reports because the army lacked even a 
systematic filing system, to say nothing of a 
processing capability. Although by 1915 there were 
ten committees theoretically handling intelligence, 
no single officer was dedicated to and responsible 
for analyzing the data that arrived. 5 
This issue of the lack of intelligence analysis will be a 
recurring theme throughout this study. 
Although the MID was struggling for its 
12 
organizational identity during this time, there is no doubt 
that the MID was active in and around Mexico. However, the 
MID was not alone. Before 1911, there were at least seven 
government agencies working in cooperation with the Mexican 
government to monitor the revolutionary activities of the 
xnagonistas and maderistas. The U.S. government agencies 
included: 
Division of Post Office Inspectors 
Treasury Department, Secret Services Division 
State Department, Special Agents 
Treasury Department, Customs Agents 
Justice Department, Bureau of Investigation 
Navy Department, Office of Naval Operations 
war Department, Military Information Division6 
Even though there was intelligence activity taking place 
along the border, there was not any systematic coordination 
of efforts taking place. 
Despite President William Howard Taft's mobilization 
of 20,000 troops on the Mexican border in March of 1911 and 
5Ibid., 5-6. 
6W. Dirk Raat, Revoltosos: Mexico's Rebels in the 
United States. 1903-1923 (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1981), 194. 
13 
the resulting fear of Japanese agents operating in Mexico, 
the "Taft administration collected little intelligence on 
Mexico." In fact, the War Department was not prepared for 
the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution. As one historian 
describes: 
Caught off guard by the revolution in Mexico, Hunter 
Liggett, new chief of the War College Division, sent 
a request for information on Mexico to the chief 
intelligence officer of the navy, T.M. Potts. Potts 
replied that he did not have any information on 
Mexico in his files because there was no naval 
attache in Mexico and because Mexican ~orts were 
rarely visited by vessels of the navy. 
Although war plans for the invasion of Mexico were 
developed in 1912, the MID did not take an active role in 
the development of those plans. In fact, "printed maps and 
travel books formed the intelligence upon which plans were 
formulated. "8 
In a study of army intelligence collection in 
relation to Mexico during 1913-17, Carter Rila concludes 
that by early 1913 "the Army developed an increasingly 
active intelligence organization along the border in 
cooperation with the civil authorities." Rila also states 
that by the end of 1913 "the basics of an efficient 
collection system had evolved in the Southern Department." 
Rila goes on to contend that: 
By 1915, there were in place (a.) a comprehensive 
7Joan Jensen, Army Surveillance in America. 1775-1980 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 119. 
8Ibid., 120. 
14 
collection organization operating along the Southern 
Department's portion of the line in cooperation with 
the WCD; (b.) the beginning of a regular cycle of 
intelligence collection in response to specific 
requirements concerning known deficiencies in the 
data base, resulting in proactive collective efforts, 
actively seeking information, not just gathering 
what happened to come in; and (c.) a system of 
distributed production by the off ice which could do 
it best, assigned by geographical area, which assured 
that everything was covered once, and nothing was 
left uncovered. 9 
As the Mexican Revolution continued through 1915 and 
1916, unrest was evident along the border and war with 
Mexico was a real possibility. In 1915, the Southern 
Department was allocated nine hundred dollars for "secret 
service" work in Mexico. 10 When Ralph Van Deman returned 
to duty with the WCD in 1915 he "found a table piled high 
with information reports from the Mexican border which were 
not even being filed." 11 van Deman lobbied for the 
creation of a "separate Military Intelligence Division, 
reporting directly to the army chief of staff, responsible 
for all military information matters, and freed from other 
staff duties. "12 
9Carter Rila, "Army Intelligence Collection and the 
Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917" (M.S. Thesis, Defense 
Intelligence College, 1991), 127-129. Headquarters for the 
Southern Department was San Antonio, Texas. The Southern 
Department had responsibility for the Mexican border from 
the Colorado River at Yuma, Arizona, to the Gulf of Mexico 
at Brownsville, Texas. 
10Jensen, Surveillance, 125. 
11Powe, in Memoranda, xv. 
12Talbert, Jr., Negative Intelligence, 7. Deman•s 
lobbying efforts were not successful at this point in time, 
15 
Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 
9, 1916, was a turning point in Mexican-U.S. relations, as 
well as the further development of military intelligence. 
One historian concludes that: 
Villa's raid crystalized American suspicions of 
foreign plots and intrigue involving Germany, Japan, 
Mexico, and the PSD; in the United States, it became 
the rallying point for those eager to strike back 
against America's enemies, real and imagined. 13 
After crossing into Mexico in pursuit of Villa, Brigadier 
General John Pershing appointed Major James Ryan as his 
intelligence officer. Military intelligence personnel from 
both the war Department and the Southern Department were 
attached to Pershing's expedition headquarters. Soon, 
information was flowing back to Washington. Unfortunately: 
The net result of all this intelligence appreciation 
was that frequent and copious information reports 
were sent back to the War Department, mostly in the 
form of telegrams. Although an officer of the war 
College Division had been detailed to read these 
reports, this was apparently the only positive 
however he was given free rein within the War College 
concerning intelligence matters. 
13James A. Sandos, Rebellion in the Borderlands: 
Anarchism and the Plan of San Diego. 1904-1923 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 140. The Plan of San 
Diego (PSD) was drafted in 1915 and signed by nine Mexican-
Americans in San Diego, Texas. According to Friedrich 
Katz, the PSD "called for an uprising of Mexican-Americans 
and blacks against Anglo-American domination in Texas, New 
Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and California. All Anglo males 
over the age of sixteen were to be killed. After victory 
each state would first constitute an independent republic 
which would then have the option of joining Mexico." For 
further information about the PSD and the German connection 
with it, see Friedrich Katz, The Secret war in Mexico: 
Europe. the United States. and the Mexican Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 339-344. 
action taken in connection with them. As a matter 
of fact, it remains very doubtful that the bulk of 
them ever found their way into the War College 
files. 14 
16 
By the end of 1916 there was a marked increase in the 
number of reports coming out of Mexico concerning German 
activities. Intelligence reports emanating from El Paso 
reported "German capital financing a Villista movement in 
Mexico to capture oil fields in Tampico." According to one 
historian, the reports from Mexico "helped harden Wilson 
into a posture of no compromise with Germany." In fact, 
publication of the Zimmermann telegram "linked the fear of 
Japanese, Mexicans, and Germans together and drove the 
administration and the American people toward war. 1115 
THE EXPANSION OF MID DURING WORLD WAR I 
According to the official historian of the Military 
Intelligence Division, Bruce Bidwell, the status of the 
army's intelligence agency at the start of World War I was 
14Bidwell, History of MID, 94-95. Pershing utilized 
native informants to provide information on both the 
villistas and carranzistas. He also used Apache scouts for 
local reconnaissance and tracking missions. 
15Jensen, Surveillance, 130. The Zimmermann telegram 
was sent by the German foreign secretary Arthur Zimmermann 
to the German minister in Mexico Heinrich van Eckardt. The 
telegram was intercepted by British intelligence who 
possessed the German codes and it was ultimately forwarded 
to the Americans. Basically, the telegram was suggesting a 
German alliance with Mexico and Japan in the event of war 
with the United States. See Barbara w. Tuchman, The 
Zimmermann Telegram (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1958) . 
17 
worse than dismal, "to all intents and purposes, there was 
no such agency in existence. 1116 
In his introduction to the thirty volume collection, 
united States Military Intelligence, Richard Challener 
states that until 1917 "the United States Army, unlike the 
Navy, had given slight attention to the development of an 
intelligence capability." Challener explains that: 
Indeed, when Elihu Root created the General Staff 
in 1903, intelligence was not made an integral part 
of the staff but rather relegated to the status of 
a subsidiary section of the Army war College. 
Thereafter it languished and was little more than a 
collector of military information. The business of 
the Intelligence Section was conducted in desultory 
fashion by a mere handful of officers and clerks; 
in April 1917 there were, in fact, only two officers 
and two clerks. 17 
After the declaration of war with Germany, the entire 
military complex expanded rapidly. The atmosphere 
surrounding this expansion was one of "complete disorder, 
mainly on the basis of expediency, while compromise and 
makeshift remained the principal order of the day." After 
typical bureaucratic infighting, the Military Intelligence 
Section, War College Division, was officially created on 
May 3, 1917. This came about "through changes published in 
the War College Division Manual rather than by the more 
16Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 109. 
17Richard D. Challener, ed., United States Military 
Intelligence. 1917-1927, vol. 1 (New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1978), v. 
18 
normal method of a War Department general order. "18 
Major Ralph H. van Deman was named to be the Chief of 
the new Military Intelligence Section. This new unit began 
with two general staff officers, one other officer, and two 
civilian clerks. By November 11, 1918, the unit had grown 
to a total of 282 officers and 1,159 civilian clerks. 19 
On June 15, 1917, Congress authorized $500,000 for 
the Military Intelligence Section and $85,000 for the 
military observer account. A total of $1,000,000 was 
appropriated for FY 1918, with an additional $100,000 "for 
the hire of spies, guides and interpreters in the field." 
A total of $2,000,000 was appropriated for FY 1919, with an 
additional $100,000 "to cover military observer expenses 
abroad," and $250,000 in a new fund "for emergency and 
extraordinary expenses, including the employment of 
translators. 1120 
The specific functions assigned to the Military 
intelligence Section included: 
(a) The collection, collation and distribution of 
military information .... 
(b) The supervision of the duties of our Military 
Attaches abroad, insofar as those duties pertain 
to the collection of military information. 
(c) Supervision over Department Intelligence Officers 
and Intelligence Officers at posts or stations 
and with commands in the field in matters 
relating purely to military intelligence. 
18Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 109-110. 
19Ibid., 110-111. 
20Ibid. I 111-112. 
(d) The consideration of questions of policy to be 
promulgated by the General Staff in connection 
with all matters of military intelligence. 
(e) The supervision and control of such system of 
military espionage and counter-espionage as 
shall be established, ... 
(f) Cooperation with the Intelligence Sections of 
the General Staff of the various countries at 
war with Germany, ... 
(g) The preparation of instructions in military 
intelligence work for the use of our forces in 
the field. 21 
The War Department went through a reorganization in 
19 
February 1918 and the Military Intelligence Section was 
upgraded to branch status and assigned to the new Executive 
Division of the General Staff . 22 
Finally, on August 26, 1918, the General Staff was 
reorganized through a war Department General Order in which 
Military Intelligence was accorded division status. The 
functional assignment given to the new Military 
Intelligence Division was as follows: 
This division shall have cognizance and control of 
military intelligence, both positive and negative, 
and shall be in charge of an officer designated as 
the director of military intelligence, who will be 
an assistant to the Chief of Staff. He is also the 
chief military censor. The duties of this division 
are to maintain estimates revised daily of the 
military situation, the economic situation, and of 
such other matters as the Chief of Staff may direct, 
and to collect, collate, and disseminate military 
intelligence. It will cooperate with the 
intelligence section of the general staffs of allied 
countries in connection with military intelligence; 
prepare instructions in military intelligence work 
for the use of our forces; supervise the training of 
personnel for intelligence work; organize, direct, 
21 Ibid. I 113 . 
22 Ibid. I 116. 
20 
and coordinate the intelligence service; supervise 
the duties of military attaches; communicate direct 
with department intelligence officers and 
intelligence officers at posts, camps, and stations; 
and with connnands in the field in matters relating 
to military intelligence; obtain, reproduce and 
issue maps; translate foreign documents; disburse 
and account for intelligence funds; cooperate with 
the censorship board and with intelligence agencies 
of other departments of the Government. 23 
The internal organization of the Military 
Intelligence division was based upon the British model. 
The British term "intelligence" came to replace the 
American military term of "information." The British terms 
"espionage" and "counterespionage" were also adopted by the 
Americans. Van Deman adopted the British numbering system 
to designate functional units within the intelligence 
agency, for example: 
M. I. 1 
M. I. 2 
M. I. 3 
M. I. 4 
M. I. 5 
M. I. 6 
M.I. 7 
M. I. 8 
M.I. 9 
M. I. 10 




- Collection, Collation, and Dissemination of 
Foreign Intelligence 
- Counter-Espionage in the Military Service 




- Cable and Telegraph 
- Field Intelligence 
- Censorship 
- Passports and Port Control 
- Graft and Fraud 
- Military Morale Section24 
Van Deman borrowed further from the British in order 
23Ibid. I 117. 
24 Ibid., 122-124. The Military Morale Section was 
formed in 1918 as an unnumbered section of MID. Bidwell 
explains that just before the Armistice, it became a 
separate branch of the General Staff and reported to the 
Executive Assistant of the General Staff. 
21 
to divide the functional units into two "fields of 
endeavor." Van Deman introduced the British terms of 
"positive intelligence" and "negative intelligence." Thus, 
the MID was further divided into two branches: 
Positive Branch 
M.I.2 Foreign Intelligence 
M.I.5 Military Attaches 
M.I.6 Translation 
M. I. 7 Graphic 
M.I.8 Cable and Telegraph 









M.I.11 Passports and 
Port Control 
M.I.12 Graft and Fraud 
Militarr: Morale 
Section 5 
One of the key issues for the MID during this time 
was that of personnel selection and training. According to 
one historian of the British intelligence agency: 
on the one hand, intelligence work was thought of as 
a professional backwater, suitable only for officers 
with a knowledge of foreign languages and for those 
not wanted for command. On the other hand, the 
activities of the many men of average or less than 
average professional competence who were thus 
detailed for intelligence confirmed the low estimate 
that had already been made of the value of 
intelligence work. 26 
25Ibid., 125. Positive intelligence can be defined as 
the gathering of information. Positive intelligence can be 
gathered through either overt or clandestine means. 
Negative intelligence can be defined as the safeguarding of 
one's own secrets, or counterintelligence. See Nathan 
Miller, Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. 
Intelligence (New York: Paragon House, 1989) . 
26Keith Jeffery, "Intelligence and Military History: A 
British Perspective," in Military History and the Military 
Profession, ed. David A. Charters, Marc Milner, and J. 
Brent Wilson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 106. 
In terms of the American MID, Van Deman was outspoken in 
his belief that intelligence work required "special 
qualifications and men of the utmost integrity." The 
reality was that intelligence positions suffered a high 
turnover rate as officers became trained and were sent to 
the European front. It was not until the end of the war 
before "systematic training" for officers was initiated, 
when "regular in-service lectures were established and a 
course on intelligence was added at the General Staff 
College. 27 
MID AND MEXICO DURING WORLD WAR I 
Institutional History 
At the beginning of the war, military intelligence 
was functioning more efficiently along the Mexican border 
than in Washington. In one study, it was shown that the 
U.S. Army "had an efficient collection and production 
organization in place on the Mexican border which served 
well throughout the war." Intelligence activities along 
the border included surveillance, collection, and SIGINT. 
The problem was the critical need at the receiving end in 
Washington for an efficient "central analysis and 
dissemination function. "28 
27Talbert, Jr., Negative Intelligence, 25. 
28Rila, "Army Intelligence Collection," 132. Signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) sources at this time included 
telegraph and radio cryptanalysis. The head of the newly 
22 
23 
Military intelligence was active along the Mexican 
border, in part due to the heightened emotions of the time. 
There was fear of a Japanese invasion emanating from Mexico 
and German spies slipping into the United States to commit 
sabotage. Loyal Mexican Americans were accused of pro-
German sympathies and anti-Americanism. 29 Americans who 
opposed the entry of the United States into the European 
war (as well as a few draft-dodgers) crossed into Mexico, 
where they were branded as "slackers," radicals, and 
socialists. Another group crossing from the United States 
into Mexico which attracted vigilance 1 by both the British 
and the U.S. intelligence agencies were members of the 
Indian anticolonial movement. Finally, attempts by the 
Wilson administration to convince the Carranza government 
to drop its neutral stance and side with the Allies 
resulted in Mexican hostility toward the United States. 30 
By late 1917 the U.S. Censorship Board was able to 
implement a plan whereby all mail was intercepted passing 
between the United States and Mexico. Federal censors were 
created cryptologic section of the Military Intelligence 
Division, MI-8 was Herbert Osborne Yardley. See David 
Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1967). See also Departments 
of the Army and the Air Force, Fundamentals of Traffic 
Analysis (Radio-Telegraph), File SRMD-017, Record Group 
457, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
29Raat, Revoltosos, 258-259. 
30Barry Carr, Marxism & Communism in Twentieth-Century 
Mexico (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 18-
19. 
24 
located at Galveston, El Paso, Laredo, San Antonio, 
Nogales, San Diego, and San Francisco. Working with these 
censors were individuals from the Department of State, 
Department of Justice, the War Board, and the Military 
Intelligence Division. Telegraphs, letters, and cables 
were censored "as the authorities sought to root out those 
individuals with anti-American, pro-German, and anti-war 
opinions. "31 
In a memo dated October 25, 1917, from the Military 
Censor in Laredo, Texas, to the Chief Military Censor in 
Washington, D.C., an explanation was provided concerning 
the contents of a message sent from Walter Hawk in Mexico 
to Samuel Holmes in Chicago. Attached to the memo were 
copies of the actual message. Correspondence initiated 
within the MID concerning the situation were included with 
this memo in the MID file. The memo stated: 
1. Copy of message dated Laredo, Texas, October 22nd, 
1917, addressed to Samuel S. Holmes, 11 s. LaSalle 
St., Chicago, Ills., signed Walter D. Hawk. 
2. The message was written in Mexico City and 
delivered to this office for transmission to Chicago. 
Mr. Charles A. Douglas, legal representative of 
President Carranza, brought the message in. 
3. Mr. Hawk and Douglas made a trip together to 
Mexico City, leaving Laredo about three weeks ago. 
4. The message as written by Mr. Hawk appears to have 
been corrected by running his pencil through certain 
sentences and that you may see the trend of his 
original thoughts when compiling the message I am 
attaching exhibit "A". 
5. The business referred to inclines me to the belief 
that some huge colonization plan is in contemplation 
for Lower California. 
31Raat, Revoltosos, 258. 
6. I am inclined to believe that the deal is being 
financed from pro-German sources. 
7. Mr. James J. Garfield of Cleveland, Ohio, can 
probably give you details of the deal if desired. 32 
25 
Concerned about possible schemes in Lower California, 
the Western Union Censor intercepted a statement sent from 
the Mexican governor of the Northern District of Lower 
California to the Associated Press: 
I feel justly indignant at the news that the press 
of the United States has been publishing, relative to 
schemes imputed to me of annexation and independence 
of Lower California. Allow me to honestly and 
forcibly state that these reports are absolutely 
false and groundless. I solenmly protest that 
neither as Governor or as a private citizen will I 
ever endorse the cession of any portion of the 
Mexican soil. 33 
Another MID unit that was very active during the war 
was Herbert Yardley's cryptographic section, MI-8. A 
number of functions were carried out by this section. One 
was to develop codes to be used by the U.S. government. 34 
Another was to break foreign codes and ciphers. 35 
32Military Censor, Laredo, Texas to Chief Military 
Censor, Washington, DC, Oct. 25, 1917; File 9700-432; 
Registers of Communications Received from Military Attaches 
and Other Intelligence Officers (Dispatch Lists) 1889-1941; 
Military Intelligence Division; Records of the War 
Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165; 
National Archives, Washington, DC. 
33Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 27, Daily 
Summary for February 6, 1918. 
34 Powe, "Sketch, " in Final Memoranda, ed. Ralph E. 
Weber, xx. MI-8 was the predecessor of the U.S. Army 
Security Agency. 
35Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 1, ix. He 
points out that of the 579 foreign codes and ciphers broken 
by 1919, 541 were Mexican. David Kahn in The Codebreakers 
26 
Subsections were established to study shorthand systems and 
secret-ink writing. 36 And finally, Yardley placed mobile 
radio intercept stations along the Mexican border in order 
to monitor German attempts to build a wireless station in 
Mexico. 37 
An intercepted cipher message, dated December 28, 
1917, from President Venustiano Carranza of Mexico to the 
Mexican ambassador to the United States Ignacio Bonillas, 
indicates the Mexican concern over American complicity in 
allowing Mexican rebels to arm themselves in the U.S. and 
then cross back into Mexico. A translation of the message 
reads: 
I have information that on the American side 
parties of Mexicans are allowed to organize, and 
armed and mounted men cross into our territory. 
Please take up this matter with the secretary 
of State, advising me of the result. 38 
states that MI-8 was reading the diplomatic telegrams of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chili, Costa Rica, Cuba, Germany, 
Mexico, Spain, and Panama. Most of the intercepted cipher 
letters sent to MI-8 by the censorship office turned out to 
be personal notes in very simple systems. Kahn quotes 
Yardley's response to some of the torrid love letters: "It 
rather worried me to see husbands and wives trust their 
illicit correspondence to such unsafe methods." 
36Kahn, Codebreakers, 352-353. The shorthand 
subsection was eventually able to read intercepted letters 
in more than thirty different systems. The secret-ink 
subsection was able to test 2,000 letters a week for 
invisible writing after the discovery of a general reagent. 
37Powe, "Sketch," in Final Memoranda, ed. Weber, xx. 
38Venustiano Carranza, President of Mexico, to Ignacio 
Bonillas, Mexican Ambassador to U.S., Dec. 28, 1917; Part 
2, Box 9, Doc. No. 73; Mexican Intercepted Messages 1912-
The MI-8 section sent copies of the intercept to both the 
State Department and to the Intelligence Off ice of the 
Southern Department. 
27 
While MI-8 was highly successful for the most part in 
conducting their intercept traffic, problems did occur. 
For example, proper translation protocols were not being 
followed by naval communication agents before forwarding 
cipher messages to MI-8 as evidenced in the following note: 
Please try to get us the original Spanish text of 
this message. The Naval Communications translator 
has obviously translated as Spanish what is really a 
part of the Cipher message. We have the entire 
alphabet of the cipher used in this message, but 
nothing can be made of the message in its present 
mutilated form. 
We have again and again pleaded that the Naval 
Communications agents be instructed to send the 
untranslated text of messages partly in cipher and 
partly in a foreign language. It is absolutely 
essential that this should be done. Will you not 
have Naval Communications give orders to this 
effect ? 39 
Throughout the war the Military Intelligence Division 
was concerned about propaganda emanating from Mexico, 
particularly that which had a pro-German or anti-American 
slant. The Daily Summary report for February 23, 1918, 
included the following information from a "reliable 
American source" in France: "the German Minister has 
1924, MI-8, Yardley File; Records of the National Security 
Agency/Central Security Office, Record Group 457; National 
Archives, Washington, DC. 
39A. Madrazo, Mexico, to Rafael Mieto Cargo Agencia 
Financiera, New York, February 4, 1918; Part 3, Box 9, Doc. 
No. 224; Yardley File; RG 457; NA. 
28 
requested his government to furnish him twenty million 
pesos for propaganda. "40 Intelligence agent w. H. Conway 
made the following observation about pro-German propaganda 
in a 1917 report to the Southern Department Intelligence 
Office: 
Creation of pro-German sentiment is fostered 
through publication of misleading newspaper articles. 
I attach to this report (exhibit A) a newspaper which 
contains a statement to the effect that American 
labor agents hire Mexicans, place them in chair cars 
at the border but later transfer them to "stock 
cars." Articles of this kind, absolutely untrue, are 
firmly believed by natives, fostered by Germans, and 
create an unfavorable anti-American (consequently 
pro-German) feeling. 41 
During this same month, the military attache in Mexico City 
reported that "The pro-German sheets, particularly the 
Boletin de la Guerra, have become, if possible, more 
bitterly hostile towards the United States than ever 
before. 1142 
The Passports and Port Control section (MI-11) of the 
Military Intelligence Division was created on September 23, 
1918. This section replaced two different subsections that 
were contained within MI-3 and MI-4. The MI-11 section was 
4°Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 27, Daily 
Summary for February 23, 1918. The twenty million pesos 
was to be used in connection with promoting pro-German 
propaganda in Mexico. 
41W.H. Conway to Captain G.V.S. Quackenbush, October 
1,1917; File 9700-334, Dispatch Lists; RG 165; NA. 
42Captain R.M. Campbell, Military Attache, to Lt. Col. 
R.H. Van Deman, General Staff, October 10, 1917; File 9700-
372; Dispatch Lists; RG 165; NA. 
required to coordinate efforts with agencies of the 
Department of State and Department of Justice. 43 
There was concern and anxiety among members of the 
U.S. federal agencies charged with the control of traffic 
29 
crossing the Mexican border. During the fall of 1917, a 
flurry of letters flew between the Departments of Justice, 
State, and War concerning the large volume of Mexican 
border traffic and the lack of control over the 
situation. 44 In a letter from R.W. Flourney, Jr., Acting 
Chief of the Bureau of Citizenship, to Lt. Colonel R.H. Van 
Deman, Chief of the Military Intelligence Section, it was 
suggested by Mr. Flourney that it would be: 
very desirable to have some competent person make a 
tour of inspection of the Mexican border, with a view 
to ascertaining and reporting definitely as to what 
further measures to regulate entry and exit across 
the border should be adopted .... Recent reports 
indicate that slackers as well as German agents are 
crossing into Mexico. Thus the matter seems to be 
one of special interest to the War Department. 45 
In a memo from Mason Peters to Colonel van Deman 
summarizing the situation, Peters states: 
Mr. Flourney suggests that the European system of 
searching passengers before they reach the Border, 
instead of actually at the Border, be adopted in 
43Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 124. 
44Letters between the State Department, Justice 
Department, and war Department, Oct. 15, 1917 to Dec. 21, 
1917; File 9700-416/1-15; Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
45R.W. Flourney, Jr., Acting Chief, Bureau of 
Citizenship, to R.H. Van Deman, Chief, Military 
Intelligence Section, Nov. 6, 1917; File 9700-416/5; 
Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
30 
this country. The custom of giving passes to those 
who make daily trips to and from the Mexican side is 
also ineffective. 
Briefly, the State Department says that the lines 
of communication between the United States and Mexico 
are not under control. 46 
One year later, the new Director of Military 
Intelligence, Marlborough Churchill, wrote a memo to the 
Provost Marshall General stating that during the past few 
months there had been "innumerable cases of German aliens 
surreptitiously crossing the border into Mexico." 
Churchill also expressed concern over the numbers of draft 
evaders appearing along the border "with the intention, no 
doubt, to seize the first opportunity to cross into 
Mexico." Churchill went on to make suggestions for 
requiring picture identification cards for "all males 
between the ages of 18 and 45" traveling within a "certain 
prescribed area" along the border. Churchill also offered 
to share information from MID files regarding the 
"illegitimate crossing of the Border. "47 
A key MID position in Mexico during the war was that 
of the military attache. At the outbreak of world War I, 
the military attache in Mexico City was Frank Ross McCoy. 
According to Andrew Bacevich, Jr., the "traditional 
46Mason Peters to Colonel van Deman, Dec. 21, 1917; 
File 9700-416/15; Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
47Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, Director of 
Military Intelligence, to the Provost Marshall General, 
Washington, DC, October 8, 1918; File 9700-416/24; Dispatch 
Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
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function of a military attache is to report to his 
government on military activities within the host nation." 
Bacevich explains that in 1917, the Mexican government was 
so focused on containing the rebel activities of Pancho 
Villa and Emiliano Zapata, that "the line separating civil 
and military affairs was ill-defined, if not altogether 
invisible." Bacevich argues that since the Mexican 
military was so involved in politics, "McCoy's 
responsibilities assumed abnormal importance. "48 
In his role as military attache, McCoy was to 
investigate reports of German activities in Mexico, 
including "sabotage directed against American-owned oil 
fields near Tampico; construction of submarine bases on the 
Gulf coast; and establishment of wireless stations to 
coordinate U-boat operations." After chasing down numerous 
rumors, McCoy came to the conclusion that the German threat 
was less dramatic than articulated by Washington. McCoy 
also made a distinction between anti-Americanism as voiced 
by Mexicans and active support for Germany. Basically, 
McCoy told Washington "not to overreact. 1149 
As the war was drawing to an end, the military 
attache in Mexico was Major (later Lt. Colonel) R.M. 
Campbell. On September 10, 1918, Campbell submitted a 
48Andrew J. Bacevich, Jr., "American Military 
Diplomacy, 1898-1949: The Role of Frank Ross McCoy," (Ph.D. 
diss., Princeton University, 1982), 140-141. 
49Ibid. I 143 -144. 
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report to the Chief of Military Intelligence, entitled 
"Forces Necessary in Case of Armed Conflict between the 
United States and Mexico." Campbell made the following 
rationalization: 
Relations between the United States and Mexico 
being in such a condition that, at any moment an 
armed conflict may be precipitated, I submit the 
following opinions for such use as the Military 
Intelligence Branch may deem expedient. Of course, 
the situation is not one to cause immediate alarm, 
but it is of such delicacy that some trivial and 
unforseen incident may produce a rupture any day. 
German influence will undoubtedly be exerted to 
prevent a rupture for economic reasons, both in 
regard to present conditions and post-war trade, and 
also because the many Germans in Mexico would have 
no place of refuge except San Salvador or certain 
South American countries, and merely casual vigilance 
on the part of our Navy would prevent an exodus to 
those havens. But German effort is constantly 
engaged in fermenting hostile feeling towards the 
United States; the existing Government is unfriendly, 
and this being true, relations may suddenly assume a 
state which will be beyond the control of 
diplomacy. 50 
After several modifications, Campbell's plan was 
endorsed by the Military Intelligence Branch. One reviewer 
of the plan noted that: 
From my experience in Mexico I would commend fully 
the report, in so far as it treats of intervention 
plans. The writer has a good grasp of the Mexican 
situation and an accurate knowledge of the Mexican 
character. 51 
50Military Attache, Mexico City, to Chief, Military 
Intelligence Branch, September 10, 1918; File 10541-764/1; 
Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
51Memorandum for Major Cotten, December 3, 1918; File 
10541-764/f/w; Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
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Objects of Investigation 
Throughout the war, there was a great deal of U.S. 
military intelligence activity taking place in Mexico, 
despite the war in Europe. In addition to the concern 
regarding German and Japanese activities, propaganda 
efforts, and rumored espionage; the MID was evaluating the 
internal situation of Mexico. Intelligence reports coming 
out of Mexico discussed rebel activities, the stability of 
the Mexican government, attitudes of the Mexican people, 
relations with the United States, military capabilities of 
the Mexican army, and other timely topics as illustrated 
below. 
In the Military Intelligence Summary Report of June 
23, 1917, it was reported: 
A report to hand, transmitted through the Southern 
Department, informs us that it is believed that 
Carranza is supporting Germany, that U-boats are 
receiving food supplies and "gas" on the Gulf Coast, 
and that Carranza will shortly force an issue with 
the United States. 52 
The following week it was reported that a "reliable 
source" had informed Naval Intelligence that the "partially 
educated class are anti-foreign and particularly anti-
American." The report went on to say that the "upper class 
are, in a large majority, pro-Ally, though there are among 
them a great many rabid pro-Germans. 1153 
52Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 1, Weekly 
Summary for June 23, 1917, 23. 
53Ibid., June 30, 1917, 16. 
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The political situation in Mexico was a constant 
topic for reporting by Military Intelligence Division. The 
following report was filed in August, 1917: 
From the West Coast it is reported that General 
Obregon is continuing his preparations with a view 
to leading a revolutionary movement against the 
Carranza Government, while Carranza, it is stated, 
is preparin~ to oust Governor Cantu of Lower 
California. 4 
The Mexican press was always combed for tidbits of 
information to be used by military intelligence, 
particularly in countering propaganda efforts. The 
following excerpt is from the August 15, 1917, edition of 
the Mexican newspaper La Orientacion, published in 
Hermosillo, Sonora: 
The proclamations state that true North Americans 
pref er to die in their own country rather than to 
die in foreign countries, fighting for the interests 
of American and English millionaires.ss 
Relations between Mexico and the United States were a 
concern relative to the possibility of armed intervention 
by the United States or an invasion initiated by Mexico. 
The assessment on this issue was reported in September, 
1917: 
Recent reports to hand indicate that Mexico will 
in the future give little trouble to the United 
States, owing to the fact that it is so greatly 
impressed by the extent of our military preparation. 
There may be internal troubles, but there will be 
s4Ibid., August 11, 1917, 21. 
ssibid., September 8, 1917, 35. 
no united action against this country. 56 
By the end of 1917, it was being reported that the 
situation in Mexico had deteriorated significantly as 
evidenced by the following report: 
Conditions in Mexico are becoming more and more 
disturbed. Reliable informants give as their 
opinion that there is such a marked undercurrent of 
unrest in Mexico that it is believed that Carranza 
is doomed to fall. How and when the overthrow of 
Carranza is to be brought about, remains 
unanswered. 57 
The continuing conflict between the Mexican 
government and the Yaqui Indians was another topic that 
caught the eye of military intelligence, particularly the 
implications for possible intervention by the United 
States, as pointed out in the following report: 
During a recent raid by Yaqui bandits, many women 
and children were massacred and young girls 
maltreated and carried off into captivity . 
... It is believed that intervention on our part 
might be useful in order to insist that some 
measures be taken to protect private property and 
life of the inhabitants in Sonora. 58 
The issue of possible U.S. intervention was still being 
debated in Mexico the following month. An informed 
35 
"observer" in Sonora reported to military intelligence that 
"All well informed Mexicans believe that a conflict with 
the United States is inevitable and among some the 
56Ibid., September 15, 1917, 24. 
57 Ibid., vol. 2, December 1, 1917, 26. 
58 Ibid., vol. 2, January 12, 1918, 3 7. 
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conviction is growing that Mexico should strike first. "59 
Even by April, the situation had not improved, "The General 
situation in Mexico continues seriously demoralized, with 
no improvement indicated for the inunediate future. "60 
As the war in Europe was nearing its end, relations 
between Mexico and the United States were reported to be 
improving. In August, 1918, it was stated that "Recent 
reports from various parts of Mexico agree in noting an 
improved feeling toward the United States, and a decline of 
German influence. "61 By November I 1918 I just days before 
the end of the war, it was reported: 
There can be no doubt that the changed tide of 
battle in Europe has had a marked effect in Mexico. 
The comparatively small reading and thinking element 
of the population has begun to realize that the war 
is proceeding to an end very different from that 
which the German propagandists have prophesied. 
Gradually the convictions of this class, supplemented 
by a more active campaign of publicity for pr-Ally 
aims and victories, is taking effect upon the feeling 
of the ignorant masses. It is easy to convince a 
Mexican that his interest lies on the side of the 
winner. 62 
THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR YEARS 
Institutional History 
The termination of the European war brought about a 
59 Ibid, vol. 3, February 9, 1918, 13. 
60Ibid, vol. 4, April 27, 1918, 17. 
61 Ibid, vol. 4, August 3, 1918, 26. 
62 Ibid. I vol. 6, November 2, 1918, 95. 
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number of changes for the U.S. Army, as well as the 
Military Intelligence Division. Downsizing and 
reorganization were critical. issues that needed to be 
addressed. According to Bidwell, MID officials were 
"realistic enough after world War I to accept the fact that 
most of the Army intelligence activities would be curtailed 
to a considerable degree upon the return of peacetime 
conditions. "63 By July 1, 1919, the MID had been reduced 
to "110 officers, 5 noncommissioned officers and 159 
civilian employees." The MID suffered a further reduction 
by June 30, 1920, to "79 officers, 4 noncommissioned 
officers and 150 civilian employees. "64 
The National Defense Act of 1920 resulted in the 
reorganization of the Army and constituted "the primary 
legal basis in governing the growth of the United States 
Army for many years to come. " 65 The War Department issued 
orders for the reorganization of the General Staff in 
compliance with the National Defense Act, creating four 
equal staff divisions: Operations, Military Intelligence, 
War Plans, and Supply. The mission of the Military 
Intelligence Division was to be responsible for the 
"collection, evaluation and dissemination of military 
information for the use of the Secretary of War, Assistant 
63Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 249. 
64 Ibid. I 252. 
65Ibid. I 250. 
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Secretary of war, Chief of Staff, and war Department 
General Staff. n 66 
The specific functions assigned to the Military 
Intelligence Division during this reorganization, included 
the following: 
(a) Formulation of policies with reference to 
military topographical surveys and maps, 
including their reproduction and distribution. 
(b) Supervision and training of military attaches, 
observers and foreign language students. 
(c) Formulation of policies affecting and the 
supervision of intelligence personnel for all 
units. 
(d) Use of codes and ciphers. 
(e) Translation of foreign documents. 
(f) Establishment and maintenance of contact with 
other intelligence agencies of the government 
and with duly accredited foreign military 
attaches and military missions. 
(g) Construction and reproduction of special maps 
required for intelligence purposes, including 
the procuring of maps from foreign sources. 
(h) Custody of the General Staff map and photograph 
collecti~1n. 67 
Another reorganization of the General Staff took 
place in 1921 after General Pershing was designated as the 
Chief of Staff on July 1, 1921. Pershing's reorganization 
resulted in the creation of five General Staff Divisions: 
Personnel (G-1), Military Intelligence (G-2), Operations 
and Training (G-3), Supply (G-4), and war Plans (WPD) . 68 
Objects of Investigation 
The focus of the Military Intelligence in the 
66Ibid., 251. 
67 Ibid., 251. 
68 Ibid. , 255. 
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immediate postwar era centered on the perceived threats of 
Bolshevism, socialism, radical activities, and labor 
unrest, among others. In Mexico, the MID watched for these 
same potentially dangerous movements spilling over into the 
United States, as well as monitoring Mexican insurrection 
movements and rebel leaders. 69 
The District Intelligence Officer in El Paso made the 
following observations concerning the general situation in 
Chihuahua, after the release by Francisco Villa of three 
American officials of the Erupcion Mining Company in 
November, 1918: 
Villa is really the master of the state of 
Chihuahua, outside of one or two of the large towns 
in the southern part of the state. The Carranza 
government is absolutely helpless when it comes to 
protecting the property of foreign interests. In 
reality Villa himself can give certain American 
interests better protection than can the 
Carrancistas. In this connection there is no doubt 
but that Villa is going to wage a campaign against 
American interests in order to raise a sum of money 
to outfit his coming campaigns. If these demands 
are not fulfilled, Villa will destroy American 
property. 70 
After the deaths of Emiliano Zapata and Aurelio 
Blanquet in 1919, it was thought by the Military 
Intelligence Division that "the rebel menace in Mexico" 
would lessen. Concerning the elimination of Zapata, the 
69Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 1, ix. 
70Ibid., vol. 6, Weekly Summary for November 30, 1918, 
283. The three Americans captured by Villa and held for 
ransom were Frank Knotts, D.B. Smith, and Ammon Tinney. 
The ransom paid to Villa was $15,000 plus a quantity of 
flour and sugar. 
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MID made the following assessment: 
Though many believed Zapata a noble patriot who was 
whole-heartedly desirous of returning to the natives 
the land exploited by Diaz, the disappearance of this 
Aztec Moses, a type little amenable to the 
requirements of advanced civilization, cannot help 
but bring the pacification of Mexico one step nearer 
than heretofore. With their leader gone, it is 
logical to expect the entire disappearance, in a 
short time, of the so-called Zapatistas. The 
Mexicans are more apt to be influenced by the 
personality of their leader than b¥i the principles 
of the cause for which they fight. 1 
As during the war itself, discussions about 
intervention by the United States continued within Mexico 
and was monitored by the MID. In a January, 1919, 
assessment it was reported that "An increasingly large 
native element in Mexico is beginning to look forward to 
foreign intervention in a spirit of hopeful anticipation, 
or, at worst, of resignation." The report ended by stating 
that "Intervention is looked upon as not desirable in 
itself, but as something to be borne with resignation as 
bringing relief in an unbearable and impossible condition 
of affairs. "72 
Also mentioned at the beginning of 1919, in 
connection with Mexico was that "Bolshevism." Since the 
spread of Bolshevism into the United States was feared, any 
mention of it was sure to raise alarm. In one report, 
Carranza was painted with the Bolshevist brush: 
71Ibid., vol. 7, April 26, 1919, 824. 
72 Ibid., vol. 6, January 4, 1919, 3 97. 
41 
"Bolshevist" is being used with increasing 
frequency as an adjective descriptive of the Carranza 
Government. In this connection the reorganization of 
the so-called Casa del Obrero Mundial, a labor 
organization of extreme !.W.W. tendencies, is viewed 
with increasing concern .... That Carranza should 
permit its resuscitation is regarded as ominous. 73 
The Weekly Intelligence Summary for March 8, 1919, 
reported that "Bolshevist agitation in Mexico is causing 
the Central Government considerable concern." In addition 
to Bolshevist agents being identified in Mexico, it was 
also noted that there was an increase in the number of 
"I.W.W. propagandists" observed in the country. Tampico 
was identified as the center for the Bolshevist movement. 
In addition, the Germans were being blamed because "it is 
apparent that they prepared the way for the radical 
doctrines now being preached by the I.W.W. and Bolshevist 
agents in Mexico. 1174 
In an article written July, 1920, in the Mexican 
newspaper, El Obrero Industrial, an American named Linn 
A.E. Gale expounded upon the virtues of Bolshevism. 
Naturally, the article made its way into the files of the 
Military Intelligence Division. In the article, Gale 
states that "No country needs bolshevism more than Mexico 
with the agonies it has passed thru for centuries, its 
73Ibid., 398. 
74 Ibid. , vol. 7, March 8, 1919, 664. 
brutal exploitation and terrible poverty. "75 In a cipher 
intercept of a message from Fernando Yglesias Calderon in 
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Washington, DC, to the government in Mexico City, Gale was 
described as a "socialist," considered "dangerous, went to 
Mexico in 1917, evading military service and it seems he is 
wanted by the military authorities." 76 
By September, 1920, Bolshevist propaganda was 
reportedly spreading into Campeche and Yucatan. It was 
alleged that Bolshevism was "being spread by revolutionary 
agents in an attempt to overthrow the government. "77 The 
next month, it was reported that "authorities in the State 
of Nayarit were confronted with the problem of Bolshevism." 
This same report indicated that state authorities "would 
deal most harshly with all persons found propagating this 
dangerous doctrine and arrested several agitators." 78 
The Military Intelligence Division was not the only 
75Translation of Article from "El Obrero Industrial, " 
July 1920; File 10038-0-12/8/W; Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 
165; NA. 
76Fernando Yglesias Calderon, Washington, to 
Relaciones, Mexico City, July 27, 1920; Part 22, Box 12, 
Doc. No. 2553; MI-8, Yardley File; RG 457; NA. As early as 
April 12, 1920, the Mexican government was made aware that 
the Americans had intercepted correspondence from Gale in 
Mexico to Bolsheviks in the United States. See Diego 
Fernandez, Washington, to Relaciones, Mexico City, April 
12, 1920; Part 22, Box 12, Doc. No. 2146; MI-8, Yardley 
File; RG 457; NA. 
77Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 14, weekly 
Summary for September 18, 1920, 5410. 
78 Ibid., vol. 15, October 9, 1920, 5532. 
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intelligence agency concerned with the threat of Bolshevism 
emanating out of Mexico. Rear Admiral Albert P. Niblack, 
Director of Naval Intelligence, reported in December 1919 
to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy: 
A Nation-wide Terrorists' campaign is being hatched 
on the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts by Germans, 
Russian and Mexican Terrorists .... 
The main planning is being done in Mexico City by 
old-time German anarchists who escaped from Chicago 
during the Haymarket riots. No definite date has 
yet been set. The Terror will surpass anything 
that ever happened in this country and the brains 
of the plot are already on the Pacific Coast, but 
it may be January or February before anything will 
be attempted, but the real directing is being done 
from Mexico City and the Mexicans who enter this 
country as railroad laborers are message carriers. 79 
Another focal point for MID surveillance centered 
around Japanese activities in Mexico. As seen in the 
following report, the underlying basis or rationale for 
this concern could be questioned. In a memo to Major 
Barnes in the war Department from Major R.B. Woodruff, it 
was reported: 
It has been reported by a gentleman returning from 
Mexico City that while he was staying at the Cosmos 
Hotel there, two Japanese occupied either Room 33 or 
34 and appeared to entertain many other Japanese. 
Two Japs also occupied Room 27 in this hotel, but 
they had left previous to the time of his departure. 
He was unable to determine what their business was. 
This may be of interest in connection with other data 
79Albert Niblack, Confidential Memorandum, December 
20, 1919, Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, box 2, 
"Official Files, Naval Department: I General," Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library; quoted in Christopher Andrew, For the 
President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American 
Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1995), 79. 
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which may perhaps be in your files. 80 
In 1919, the MID was concerned that Japan was 
"pushing her efforts towards industrial expansion in 
Mexico. " A large purchase of henequen by Japanese 
merchants and the expected arrival of Japanese ships at the 
port of Manzanillo were considered "forerunners of a closer 
business relation between Mexico and Japan." The 
immigration of 6,000 Japanese into Lower California was 
also touted as being of "economic significance." It was 
theorized that an "extensive colonization scheme on the 
west coast is indicated also by the reports concerning the 
purchase of land in this section of the country by Japanese 
syndicates." It was also reported by the Mexican press 
that Japan was attempting "to obtain, at any cost, oil 
grants which will allow her to convert her ships into oil-
burners and to use oil as a motive power for her industrial 
machinery. "81 
At the end of 1920, a report was produced by the 
District Intelligence Office in Nogales, Arizona, regarding 
Japanese activities on the West Coast. An ongoing 
investigation had been conducted for three years with a 
80R.B. woodruff, Major, General Staff, to Major 
Barnes, May 19, 1919; File 1766-1049/1; Dispatch Lists; 
MID; RG 165; NA. In a handwritten note at the bottom of 
the memo, Woodruff indicated that "The M.A. Mexico City has 
~been notified of these facts." 
81Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 7, Weekly 
Summary for April 5, 1919, 778-779. 
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series of reports having been generated on this subject. 
The 1920 report stated that "R-1 of this office reports the 
presence of a large number of Japanese in Sonora and 
Sinaloa, scattered over considerable territory." The 
report went on to say that parties of Japanese were engaged 
in "mapping expeditions." It was also reported that the 
Japanese had been granted "practically unlimited 
concessions on the West Coast," especially in the area of 
fishing agreements. The report concluded with the names 
with short biographical comments of eight Japanese 
individuals . 82 
The activities of Germans were also closely monitored 
by the MID. Information gleaned from Mexican newspapers 
revealed that large numbers of Germans were migrating to 
Mexico from Europe. In addition, "thousands of wealthy 
German-Americans are preparing to move into Mexico and 
become Mexican citizens, ten thousand intending to go from 
Texas alone. "83 
Arms and munitions shipped from Germany to Mexico 
were another concern. In March, 1920, a Japanese vessel 
carrying German arms was observed leaving Hamburg bound for 
Mexico. That same month, German "bombardment aeroplanes of 
82District Intelligence Office, Nogales, Arizona, to 
A.C. of S. for M.I., Hdq. 8th Corps Area, Fort Sam Houston, 
Texas, December 21, 1920; File 1766-0-38/1; Dispatch Lists; 
MID; RG 165; NA. 
83Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 9, Weekly 
Summary for September 13, 1919, 1777. 
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the Gotha type" were alleged to have been shipped from 
Germany to Spain and then to Mexico. Supposedly, twenty 
German pilots accompanied the shipment in order to serve as 
pilots and instructors. "84 • Later during the same year, it 
came to light that the "Deums News Agency of Germany in 
September offered government officials and newspapers free 
press service, with the intention of introducing German 
propaganda into Mexico." 85 
The economic situation in Mexico relative to oil 
production was assessed in 1919. It was reported that 
during the month of January, 1919, oil production had 
increased fifty percent over January of the previous year. 
In terms of the issue of nationalization and royalties, it 
was stated that "It is evident that the attitude of the 
Mexican authorities toward the exaction of royalties is not 
yet established." Commenting on the military situation in 
the oil fields, it was remarked that conditions "have not 
changed materially for the last three years." Theft, 
murder, and forced loans were common. As far as the rebels 
themselves, "When the rebels are in power, they are paid 
$50,000 a month for protection, and thus better order is 
maintained than when the federals are campaigning against 
84 Ibid., vol. 12, April 9, 1920, 3444. 
85Ibid., vol. 15, October 9, 1920, 5532. It was 
claimed that "some of the papers have already accepted this 
offer." 
the rebels. 1186 
The political and military situation in Mexico was 
analyzed in the fall of 1920 with several intelligence 
reports originating in Mexico. Commenting on Obregon and 
de la Huerta, a November 23, 1920 report stated: 
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The political attitude of Obregon and De La Huerta 
is commented upon in two ways by the public in 
general. The radicals claim that they will support 
Morones and Felipe Carrillo and will initiate a 
movement of Bolsheviki characteristics that will 
attract the laboring element and prevent a real 
"social revolution." Merchants, manufacturers, and 
business people in general say: "Obregon sees that 
he will be unable to obtain recognition from the U.S. 
unless he can dominate the radical element - not 
believing this possible he has decided to aid them 
in order to get their support and present a solid 
front against an American invasion - which is 
regarded as imminent." They consider this the only 
possible means of uniting the radical element with 
the Government and people. 87 
The same report also commented on the military situation in 
Mexico. The report observed that "The military element is 
equally uneasy, they claim they are being made to work 
without pay." The report goes on to explain that those 
soldiers who have not yet deserted state "that their chiefs 
are awaiting a favorable opportunity to go to Chiapas and 
join Basave y Pina, head of the Zapatista movement in 
Chiapas. 1188 
86Ibid., vol. 7, April 12, 1919, 800. 
87Report No. 2021 from Mexico to Military 
Intelligence, November 23, 1920; File 10058-0-3/132; 
Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
88Ibid. Apparently, at some posts soldiers had gone a 
month without pay. It was also heard among some soldiers 
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A different picture of Mexico was painted by Arthur 
Constantine in a September 10, 1919, article in The 
Outlook, which found its way into the MID files. According 
to Constantine: 
Always fascinating Mexico makes another picture 
entirely when you take the trouble to check up the 
headlines and the old residents with the accurately 
gathered and compiled official information of our own 
Government organizations. The truth is, as the 
returns demonstrate beyond argument, that Mexico is 
already so far along the comeback path that 
commercially the landmarks of the often-ref erred-to 
other epochs of that country's history have been left 
behind the horizon .... 
Mexico's export trade with the United States is 
thus shown to have increased both in quantity and in 
value more than one hundred per cent since 1914 .... 
In the light of the foregoing easily available 
official data about things Mexican, it is a test of 
one's intelligence to be expected to take seriously 
the generalities that pass current for truth about 
the conditions in that country. 89 
Abductions and attacks upon Americans were monitored 
by both the press and the MID. The weekly report for 
October 27, 1919, from the military attache in Mexico City 
commented on the abduction of the American Consular Agent 
in Puebla, William o. Jenkins. On the night of October 
20th, "three masked individuals," abducted him from his 
factory "after obliging him to open his safe and deliver 
and junior officers that they hoped "for another revolution 
in order that they might have a chance to better their 
fortune." 
89Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 9, Weekly 
Summary for September 20, 1919, 1847-1849. For statistical 
information see David E. Lorey, ed., United States-Mexico 
Border Statistics Since 1900 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin 
American Center Publications, 1990). 
them the money on hand, which amounted to something like 
70,000 Pesos, and for whose return they demanded a ransom 
of 300,000 Pesos." 90 
49 
The Jenkins "Case" would continue over the course of 
the next fourteen months, be made into "a cause celebre," 
and bring "the two nations to the brink of war," according 
to one historian. This same historian also argues that the 
Jenkins case "demonstrates the frightening ease with which 
a relatively unimportant incident achieves major 
proportions during a period of international tension. "91 
According to Alvaro Torre D1az, Mexican ambassador to the 
U.S., "If it had not been for measures taken by Pres. 
Wilson, intervention would have been a fact. " 92 
90weekly Report from the Off ice of the Military 
Attache, Mexico City, October 27, 1919; No. 1320; Registers 
of Communications Received from Military Attaches and Other 
Intelligence Officers (Dispatch Lists), 1889-1941; Military 
Intelligence Division; (University Publications of America 
Microfilm, roll 1, frame 109); Records of the war 
Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165; 
National Archives, Washington, DC. Consular agents at this 
time were part-time employees of the Foreign service and 
were usually businessmen representing American commercial 
interests. 
91Charles c. Cumberland, "The Jenkins Case and 
Mexican-American Relations," The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 31, no. 4 (November 1951): 586, 606. 
92Alvaro Torre D1az, Washington, to A. de la Huerta, 
Mexico City, June 23, 1920; Part 21, Box 12, Doc. No. 2454; 
Yardley File; MI-8; RG 457; NA. 
50 
DOWNSIZING IN THE TWENTIES 
Institutional History 
The activities and attitudes of the MID underwent 
another transformation during the period from 1921 to 1927. 
The number of MID personnel dropped almost in half from 
1920 to 1921. By 1921, there were now 24 officers (79 in 
1920), four enlisted men (5 in 1920), 107 civilians (150 in 
1920), for a total staff of 135 men. Contingency 
appropriations dropped to $300,000 in 1921, compared to 
$400,000 in 1920. This downsizing trend continued every 
year through 1927. In 1927, there were 25 officers, no 
enlisted men, and 50 civilians, for a total staff of 75. 
Contingency appropriations were $61,520 for the year 
1927. 93 
One of the areas that concerned MID during this time 
was that of the military attache system. Effective July 1, 
1922, the entire military attache system was supervised by 
one officer and three civilian clerks. At this point, 
there were "30 Military Attaches, stationed within the same 
number of different countries, and assisted by 14 line and 
6 air officers." By 1926, only twenty-two posts remained 
93Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 258. 
Although Bidwell points out that the MID experienced a 
steady decline of resources between the world wars, he also 
sees "constructive progress." Bidwell argues that MID 
officials "actually did manage to achieve a great deal of 
material progress despite the severe handicaps resulting 
from personnel and fund limitations." 
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filled. However, forty-five countries were covered to some 
extent due to the use of "dual accreditation procedures. "94 
A major issue impeding the efficiency of the military 
attache system was the inability to secure "adequate 
expense allowances for its personnel." Officers on foreign 
duty were forced to use their own personal funds for 
"official representation purposes." Bidwell explains that: 
Because the governmental allowances designed to cover 
such disbursements were so completely insufficient, 
the selection of officers for military attache 
assignment had soon narrowed down to a choice from 
among those who were fortunate enough to enjoy a 
considerable outside income. 
It was apparently this unfavorable feature of 
officer procurement, more than anything else, which 
gave the American military attache system its 
admittedly poor refutation during most of the 
peacetime period. 9 
In addition to reviewing the activities and staffing 
levels of the Military Intelligence Division, one must also 
look at the attitudes and perceptions of the MID in 
operation at this time. In the words of one historian, 
"the attitudes of M.I. simply reflected broader, prevailing 
94 Ibid. I 380. 
95Ibid., 381. The end result was that the system 
became filled with personnel "used to living on a 
comparatively expensive scale." Bidwell points out that 
the "resultant show of ostentation not only caused a 
hostile reaction to smoulder within the Army itself but 
also adversely affected the opinion of many influential 
members of Congress, executive officials of the government 
and even much of the public at large." Consequently, 
funding reciuests to increase the representation allowances 
for attaches tended to encounter fierce opposition. 
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American cultural attitudes in the twenties. " 96 Describing 
the attitudes of the 1920s, one historian has remarked that 
it was a period when "Klan membership soared into the 
millions, and nativists wrote their prejudices into the 
statute books. "97 Another historian has stated that the 
"bigotry engendered by contemporary attitudes led ... to 
view Latin Americans as inferior people. "98 In terms of 
attitudes toward the military, one historian argues that 
"there is no question that the political and intellectual 
atmosphere in the United States during the twenties opposed 
large-scale military and naval expenditures. 1199 
Objects of Investigation 
Despite negative attitudes toward military 
expenditures, however, U.S. military planners "continued to 
draft and update unilateral plans for intervention and 
invasion of key Latin American countries if cooperative 
96Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 1, xi. 
97Howard Zinn, The Politics of History, 2nd ed. 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 103. 
98Benjamin T. Harrison, "The Business of America is 
Business - Except in Mexico: Chandler Anderson's Lobby 
Efforts in the 1920's," Mid-America 68, no. 2 (April-July 
1986): 82. Chandler Anderson wrote to the newly appointed 
Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, concerning 
business in Latin America and stating that "we should now 
recognize the necessity for the cooperation of all America 
and Europe to resist the encroachment of the colored 
races." Anderson also enclosed a copy of Theodor 
Stoddard's The Rising Tide of Color Against the White 
World-Supremacy (1920) as quoted in Harrison, 82. 
99John Braeman, "Power and Diplomacy: The 1920 's 
Reappraised," The Review of Politics 44 (July 1982): 345. 
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approaches should fail. 11100 The war plans developed for 
Mexico utilized the color code "Green" and were "the most 
detailed and highly developed of all the hemisphere Color 
plans." 101 
Although detailed military plans were developed for 
Mexico, it was Japan that military planners were most 
concerned about in the 1920s. 102 While the Navy focused on 
developing plans to counter the Japanese in the Pacific, 
the Army was concerned with Japanese activities in Mexico. 
Japanese activities in Mexico were closely monitored. 
A number of reports were submitted to Washington regarding 
the business activities in Mexico of a Mr. M. Matsumoto of 
Japan, particularly the matter of oil concessions in Lower 
100John Child, "From Color to Rainbow: u. S. Strategic 
Planning for Latin America, 1919-1945," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 21, no. 2 (May 
1979): 233. "Special Plan Green" was the color plan for 
military operations against Mexico, updated from the 1920s 
through 1940. Special Plan Green was based upon the 
earlier "General Mexican War Plan" of 1919. 
101 Ibid., 240. According to Child, "the final version 
of 1940 is over eight inches thick and has detailed 
instructions for all supporting and subordinate military 
units as small as separate detachments and as far away 
geographically as Vermont and Massachusetts." 
102Gerald E. Wheeler, "National Policy Planning Between 
the World wars: Conflict Between Ends and Means," Naval war 
College Review 21 (February 1969): 55. For an analysis of 
the military perspective of national policy during this 
time, see Fred Greene, "The Military View of American 
National Policy, 1904-1940," American Historical Review 
(1961): 354-377. 
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California. 103 During the fallowing year, a report was 
submitted from the Department Intelligence Officer at Fort 
Sam Houston to the War Department in Washington based upon 
the observations of an informant by the name of J.W.: 
Have from good source that the Japs have 
virtually secured control of all lands available in 
and about Acapulco on the Pacific coast and one of 
the finest ports of same; by air line it is six hours 
trip to Mexico City. 104 
In 1924, several reports were filed from the Military 
Attache in Mexico City regarding Japanese activities. In 
April of that year it was reported that a colonization 
project involving the Mexican states of Colima, Nayarit, 
Sonora, Sinaloa, and Jalisco could include up to 32,000 
Japanese. In October, it was reported that 20,000 Japanese 
would colonize Lower California. In November, "four 
prominent Japanese" were interviewed by the Mexican 
newspaper El Democrata. The four were on a tour of "study 
and observation" of various Central and South American 
103Japanese Oil Concessions in Mexico (Service Report), 
January 27, 1921; File 1766-0-39/7; Harvey Miller, Acting 
Military Attache, to Director, Military Intelligence 
Division, Washington, DC, February 18, 1921; File 1766-0-
39/8; Japanese Activities on the West Coast of Mexico, 
August 27, 1921; File 1766-0-39/17; W.H. Cowles, Chief, 
M.I. 4, to W.L. Hurley, Office of the Under Secretary, 
Department of State,_ September 28, 1921; File 1766-0-39/23; 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G-2, Washington, DC, October 3, 1921; File 1766-0-39/24; 
Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
104Acapulco & Vicinity, January 9, 1922; File 1766-0-
39/25; Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 165; NA. 
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countries. 105 Also occurring this same year was the 
signing of a treaty of "Amity, Commerce and Navigation" 
between Japan and Mexico. Among other clauses and 
conditions, the treaty stipulated: 
that nationals of either country may, in accordance 
with the laws of the country, travel, rent, purchase, 
and, in general, devote themselves to commerce, 
industry, etc., in the territory of the other. 106 
The United States was concerned about the stability 
of Mexico, both externally and internally. Obviously, 
intrigue or perceived intrigue by foreign nationals and 
agents operating within Mexico was monitored by military 
intelligence. However, it was the internal stability (or 
perceived lack thereof) that most concerned the United 
States. For example, a great deal of attention was focused 
by military intelligence upon the political and military 
situation in Mexico. 
National elections and the intrigue surrounding those 
elections were of significant interest to the Military 
Intelligence Division because of the potential for 
105G-2 Report, Japanese Colonists from California to 
Mexico, April lS, 1924; File 2064-446; G-2 Report, Japanese 
Activities in Mexico, October 24, 1924; File 2064-446/3; 
G-2 Report, Emigration and Immigration - Japanese, November 
S, 1924; File 2064-446/4; Dispatch Lists; MID; RG 16S; NA. 
A comment at the bottom of the last report stated: "As yet, 
the only information which this office has regarding the 
object of these visitors is contained in the above press 
reports. The matter is being carefully watched and 
developments will be promptly reported." 
106G-2 Report, Japanese Activities in Mexico, October 
9, 1924; File 4974; M.I. Reports, Mexico, 1919-1941: (UPA 
Microfilm, roll 1, frame 478); RG 165; NA. 
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rebellion against the national government of Mexico and the 
resulting insecurity for American interests. In 1926 the 
Military Attache in Mexico City submitted a report to 
Washington detailing the latest developments in "pre-
election intrigue," related to the upcoming 1928 
presidential elections. In his report, Lt. Col. Edward 
Davis identified the "outstanding personalities" in the 
current pre-election intrigue as being: President Calles; 
Former President Obregon; Secretary of Industry, Conunerce 
and Labor Luis N. Morones; General of Division Arnulfo R. 
Gomez; and General of Division Francisco R. Serrano. Davis 
drew the following conclusions: 
The political psychology of Mexico is a startling 
re-production of that of the Near and Middle East. 
To predict is to confess that one has learned 
nothing. Only very general conclusion may safely be 
drawn .... 107 
Predictions and analysis of the presidential 
candidates continued throughout 1926 and 1927. Major 
Harold Thompson, Acting Military Attache in Mexico City, 
submitted a report in April of 1927 in which he listed the 
top three presidential candidates. Thompson listed the 
candidates 11 in order of their estimated strength and in 
their chances for being elected." The three were: Alvaro 
Obregd'n, Francisco Serrano, and Arnulfo Gomez. Thompson 
107G-2 Report, National Elections, April 23, 1926; File 
2657-g-622/2; M.I. Reports, Mexico, 1919-1941; (UPA 
Microfilm, roll 3, frame 124); RG 165; NA. The source for 
Davis' report was a "study of all available information." 
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based his analysis on information gathered from the 
following sources: the press, records of the Military 
Attache's Office, confidential informants, and a study of 
the situation. 108 
The last presidential analysis appearing in the 1927 
MID Weekly Summaries was for the period July 23 to August 
s. This summary report points out that "Obregon is the 
Administration's choice for the presidency in 1928." The 
report states that all three candidates are proponents of 
foreign capital investment, however: 
Obregon makes a distinction between "honest" American 
capital and "Wall Street" which, he states, "seeks to 
promote crises and conflicts in and with Mexico." 
In analyzing the "manifestos" of the three candidates, 
military intelligence tended to look most favorably upon 
Serrano's manifesto because it constituted: 
a most enlightened statement of the political 
situation in Mexico and of the importance of cordial 
international relations, particularly between the 
United States and Mexico, in the development of the 
national life of Mexico. 109 
According to the MID analysis, the real issues of the 
1928 presidential election "are not so much those of 
108G-2 Report, National Elections, April 22, 1927; File 
1490; M.I. Reports, Mexico, 1919-1941; (UPA Microfilm, roll 
3, frames 144-145); RG 165; NA. Although Obregon was 
considered the top candidate at this point in time, Obregon 
himself did not openly declare his candidacy. Even Serrano 
and Gomez limited themselves to only making general 
statements about the election. 
109Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 26, Weekly 
Summary for July 23 to August 5, 1927, 11752-11753. 
principles, but of personalities and the corresponding 
strength of the personal following of the different 
candidates." In the end, the report concluded that: 
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The possibilities of the situation are numerous, 
but it is well to bear in mind that the most 
important factor in the ultimate outcome is the 
loyalty of the army, and next to that in significance 
is the attitude of Obregon. A compromise on 
Obregon•s part may afford a happy and peaceful 
solution to a situation otherwise fraught with grave 
dangers. 110 
Another aspect of the political realm for MID 
purposes was the stability of the national government in 
Mexico City, specifically, control of the countryside and 
containment of the various rebel movements. The United 
States was concerned about the possible spread of radical 
movements, as well as potential threats against property 
and investment interests. 
A military intelligence weekly summary prepared for 
the week of March 12, 1921 reported upon the growing unrest 
of the Yaqui Indians; dispersement of bandits in Sonora; 
plots for an insurrection in Northern Mexico; railway 
strikers wrecking a train near Monterey; federal troops 
preventing a revolt in Tampico; and labor unrest spreading 
in Tampico. 111 By the following year, revolutionary 
110Ibid., 11753-11754. It is also interesting to note 
the MID's understanding of the term "suffrage," as used by 
the Mexicans. "Effective suffrage, in the Mexican 
understanding of the term, is not free suffrage, but a 
suffrage resulting from the imposition of the Executive 
will, by force of arms, if necessary." 
111Ibid., vol. 17, March 12, 1921, 7430-7432. 
movements in Northern Baja California and Northern Sonora 
had failed. In fact, the Military Intelligence Division 
was indicating that the lack of success "appears to have 
attended all other revolutionary movements against the 
present Government so far attempted in other parts of the 
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Republic." The MID concluded that "the Government seems to 
have anticipated the outbreaks and to have acted promptly 
and vigorously in repressing them." 112 
Francisco Villa was assassinated in July, 1923. An 
intercepted cipher message from General Eugenio Mart!nez, 
Conunanding General of the 5th Jef atura (Headquarters 
Chihuahua) to the Mexican War and Navy Department, 
indicated that a large cache of carbines, rifles, 
ammunition, hand grenades, and bombs had been found at 
Canutillo (Villa's hacienda). A confidential informant 
reported that the arms and munitions had been supplied to 
Villa by Adolfo de la Huerta. This informant maintained 
that Villa and de la Huerta had been conspiring against the 
Obregon government in order to advance de la Huerta's 
ambitions to become President. This same informant also 
stated: 
that it was the current belief in Mexican military 
112 Ibid, vol. 21, January 14, 1922, 9224. The MID 
acknowledged the existence of "much discontent and 
disaffection" in Mexico, but "no evidence that the various 
disaffected elements are sufficiently organized, united in 
a common cause, equipped or provided with leaders to an 
extent seriously threatening, for the present, the 
continuance in power of the Obregon administration." 
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circles that both General Obregon and General Calles 
were informed of Villa's apparent preparations for 
active opposition and had agreed as to the necessity 
of eliminating him in some way. 113 
By the end of 1923, it was being reported by the 
Military Intelligence Division that Mexico was "again in 
the throes of a revolution of such serious proportions as 
to threaten the overthrow of the existing government." 
According to the MID, although it occurred suddenly, this 
revolutionary activity was not totally unexpected because 
of the "approaching presidential campaign." The chief 
factions involved in this activity included General 
Plutarco El!as Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta, "the two 
principal opposing candidates for the presidency in the 
1924 campaign." The full extent of rebellious activity was 
unclear at this point and predictions regarding the outcome 
could not be made. It was concluded, however, that the 
"controlling factor rests entirely on the loyalty or 
disloyalty of the Federal military forces." 114 
The MID drew the following conclusions about Mexico 
based upon events that occurred during the year 1926: 
Internal and external political conditions have 
steadily grown much worse during the year. Economic 
113G-2 Report, Political-Military Situation (Also 
Assassination of Francisco Villa), July 28, 1923; File 
4065; M.I. Reports, Mexico, 1919-1941; (UPA Microfilm, roll 
1, frames 272-273); RG 165; NA. 
114Ibid., vol. 22, December 15-28, 1923, 9974-9977. 
Military operations were characterized "by much maneuvering 
on both sides combined with a manifest disinclination for 
decisive battle." 
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conditions show a similar deterioration, industry 
being paralyzed and agriculture being carried on 
haltingly in the face of rural anarchy owing to the 
maladministration, or lack of any administration, of 
the agrarian laws. Armed uprisings and banditry have 
greatly increased. The year has proved to everyone, 
except the Administration, that social-economic 
reforms, however promising in phraseology, always 
fail when there is no appropriate competent class of 
society to carry them out; no effective medium for 
their practical execution. 115 
Rebellion continued throughout the year of 1927. In 
May of that year, the Military Intelligence Division 
reported that: 
The armed rebellion in northern Colima, in all 
parts of Jalisco, in southern zacatecas, in southern 
S~n Luis Potosi, in all of Guanajuato, and in 
Guerrero maintains its intensity, but has not spread 
in extent. 116 
This same report also warned that the greatest danger to 
the administration "would appear to be in that region where 
rebel activities have thus far been least noticeable, 
namely, in the states along the northern frontier." The 
report went to theorize that if rebellion did break out and 
spread in the north, then the "present military situation 
in the center of the Republic would immediately become 
acute and the loyalty of prominent military leaders might 
be doubtful." A reliable source reported that "symptoms of 
trouble in the north are beginning to develop" and that 
115Ibid., vol. 26, January 8-21, 1927, 11476. 
116Ibid., vol. 26, May 14-27, 1927, 11656. This same 
report remarked that "a curve representing the stability of 
the present administration in Mexico, during the year 1927, 
would present a steady decline from January 1st to May 
1st." 
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this development in the north had the character of "the 
last straw. "117 
In July of 1927, the Military Intelligence Division 
identified five areas throughout the world that were either 
"existing" or "potential areas of unrest." Mexico was 
cited as one of the five danger spots. In its analysis of 
the situation in Mexico, the MID stated: 
But this is true not so much because of the magnitude 
of present rebel activities in that country, though 
these have grown to significant proportions during 
the past year, as because of the potentialities for 
serious conflict which lie in its discordant 
international relationships and unfavorable domestic 
situation. 118 
Much of the Febel activity during this time centered 
around Church-State relations and the Cristero Rebellion of 
1926-1929. The Cristero Rebellion ignited after the 
February 1926 press interview of Archbishop Jose Moray del 
Rio, in which the archbishop reacted strongly against 
President Calles' enforcement of the anticlerical articles 
of the Constitution, which had been ignored by earlier 
presidents. 119 Violence continued unabated throughout the 
117 Ibid., 11656-11657. However, in its summary, the 
report did state that "a diagnosis of the current situation 
reveals no symptom which is an immediate certain threat." 
118 Ibid., vol. 26, July 9-22, 1927, 11720. This report 
concluded that if the United States "were to withdraw 
recognition of the present regime or raise the embargo on 
arms to Mexico, a serious crisis would result." 
119Michael c. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The Course 
of Mexican History, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 587. After the press interview, Calles 
stepped up the enforcement of the anticlerical articles. 
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rebellion. On April 20, 1927, "the Cristeros dynamited a 
Mexico City-Guadalajara train, killing over a hundred 
innocent civilians." In retaliation, "government troops 
tried to kill a priest for every dead teacher. 11120 
Commenting on the April 20th train assault, the MID 
reported that the government "charged the Episcopate with 
directly instigating the attack and ordered the inunediate 
arrest of the leading archbishops and bishops. 11121 By April 
23, eight bishops were deported to Laredo, Texas. The MID 
concluded that: 
There is no evidence to show, directly or 
indirectly, that the Episcopate directed the attack 
referred to, and the act of expulsion, preceded by 
General Alvarez's charges, is believed to be the 
Government's effort to throw the responsibility for 
the train outrage on the Catholic church and its 
leaders. It is believed that this action of the 
Calles Government will be followed by reprisals in 
a more violent form. 122 
A critical area of concern for military intelligence 
In an unprecedented move, the archbishop declared a strike 
on July 31, 1926. The strike would last for the next three 
years. The situation degenerated into violence and 
atrocities were committed by both sides. 
120Ibid. I 588. 
121G-2 Report, Religion, Freedom of Religious Belief 
and Practice, Persecution of Clergy, Arrest and Expulsion 
of the Bishops, April 26, 1927; File 1498; M.I. Reports, 
Mexico, 1919-1941; (UPA Microfilm, roll 2, frames 773-774); 
RG 165; NA. The bishops came from the States of Mexico, 
Michoacan, Puebla, Huejutla, Aguascalientes, Saltillo, 
Cuernavaca, and Chiapas. 
122 Ibid. This particular report was submitted by Major 
Harold Thompson, Acting Military Attache, Mexico City, and 
was based upon information gathered from confidential 
informants, the press, and consular reports. 
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during the twenties included the topic of U.S.-Mexican 
relations, especially as that related to the possible 
intervention by the United States into the internal affairs 
of Mexico. Specific issues of contention included 
American property rights, the extent of Mexican 
nationalism, Mexican anticlericalism, rebel activities, 
radicalism, the recognition of Mexico by the U.S., and the 
Nicaraguan crisis. 
In a weekly intelligence sunnnary prepared in May 
1921, the MID included a report from an "observer" 
analyzing the general Mexican situation, who stated that: 
It is true that the introduction of American labor 
into the Tampico fields has caused trouble there. 
The Tampico situation is really the center of the 
whirlpool, as the oil interests are the ones most 
vitally affected by Article 27 of the Constitution 
of 1917, and even though President Obregon has 
repeatedly stated that he would like to see the 
Constitution so interpreted as to do away with most 
of the objectionable features, nevertheless, no 
actual steps have been taken to accomplish this, and 
in the meantime the oil companies are paying 
excessive taxation and do not know just what their 
rights are. 123 
This same observer went on to comment about the possibility 
of American intervention in Mexico: 
The question of American intervention is the one 
now uppermost in the minds of the Mexican people and 
in private conversations great numbers will state 
that they really do desire and would welcome 
intervention, but of course cannot make such 
statements in public. 
It is certain that at present the Mexican people 
have not within themselves the elements of government 
123Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 17, weekly 
Summary for May 2, 1921, 1·a26. 
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and that some strong outside force must eventually 
take hold of the country in order to save it for the 
good of humanity. 124 
On June 12, 1925, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg 
released a statement to the press addressing the attitude 
of the United States toward Mexico. This press release 
came on the heels of a series of conferences between 
Ambassador James R. Sheffield and the Mexican government. 
In his conclusion, Kellogg stated: 
The Government of Mexico is now on trial before the 
world. We have the greatest interest in the 
stability, prosperity and independence of Mexico. We 
have been patient and realize, of course, that it 
takes time to bring about a stable government but we 
cannot countenance violations of her obligations and 
failure to protect American citizens. 125 
It is interesting to note the reaction by the MID to 
Kellogg's press release: "Secretary Kellogg's statement to 
the press of the 12th instant concerning the relations of 
the United States and Mexico, came as a complete surprise 
to G-2. "126 In analyzing Secretary Kellogg's comments, MID 
made the following inference: 
the United States Government has definitely discarded 
the old policy of "watchful waiting" and, in pursuing 
a more energetic course of action, is ready to go to 
any extreme in order that American and other foreign 
rights and interests in Mexico be adequately 
protected and the international engagements and 
124 Ibid., 7829. 
125G-2 Report, The State Department's Announcement of 
Policy Toward the Present Mexican Situation, June 23, 1925; 
File 2657-G-569; M.I. Reports, Mexico, 1919-1941; (UPA 
Microfilm, roll 1, frames 742-748); RG 165; NA. 
126Ibid. 
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obligations of the Mexican government be met. 127 
Analyzing the situation in Mexico as it pertained to 
church-state relations during 1926, the Military 
Intelligence Division concluded that the enforcement of the 
anticlerical articles of the Mexican constitution was a 
"constitutional function of the Executive branch of the 
government." As the situation related to possible 
intervention, it was observed that: 
In the performance of these duties the Mexican 
government is sovereign and subject to no outside 
interference by foreign governments, unless the 
rights of their nationals are interfered with. The 
question itself is therefore a purely Mexican one 
and apt to remain such unless the ri~hts of 
foreigners are flagrantly violated. 12 
At the beginning of 1927, a military intelligence 
summary was produced highlighting the events of 1926 in 
Mexico. On the issue of U.S.-Mexican relations, it was 
concluded that "among the people at large the feeling 
toward the United States has very probably grown more 
cordial, while in the group which rules the country that 
feeling has grown more hostile. 11129 
A tense situation developed in 1927 when the Calles 
government turned over approximately 350 documents stolen 
127 Ibid. 
128Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 25, Weekly 
Summary for July 24 to August 6, 1926, 11233. This 
particular report did not contain, nor did it reference, 
any definition of what constituted flagrant violation of 
the rights of foreigners (i.e., U.S. citizens). 
129Ibid., vol. 26, January 8-21, 1927, 11476. 
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from the U.S. embassy in Mexico City. The collection of 
documents included "official correspondence between the 
ambassador and the secretary of state, consular dispatches, 
reports of the military attache, and apparently some 
forgeries." 130 One of the military attach~ reports included 
the following comments: 
That the white man is somewhat disliked is natural 
but if the Mexican people are ever so fortunate as 
to be blessed with American intervention and 
administration this alleged bitter hatred of 
Americans will be proved a fake of the thinnest 
type ... The year has proved that Mexico has little 
if any hope of developing into a self-supporting, 
respectable member of the community of Nations 
unless she received from the outside something she 
has never really had, that is to say extended 
training in actual self-government combined with 
education for the masses and proper economic 
development. 131 
Although the situation was both tense and embarrassing, the 
historian James Horn concludes: "After an exhaustive 
search, this author has been unable to find any evidence in 
state department, military, or naval files that 
intervention had ever been contemplated. 11132 
130James J. Horn, "Did the United States Plan an 
Invasion of Mexico in 1927," Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 15 {November 1973): 458. The 
documents were examined by the State Department and 
Military Intelligence to assess damage control and 
implications. 
131 Ibid., 459-460. Although there was some press 
coverage of this episode, Horn maintains that "neither the 
Mexican nor American people ever learned the whole story." 
132Ibid., 464. Horn also quotes from an article in a 
1927 issue of The Economist in which the correspondent 
refers to the probability of intervention: " ... that our 
intentions are pacific seems certain. In fact, part of the 
During 1927 the Military Intelligence Division also 
produced a series of articles on "Important Treaties and 
International Agreements." One of the articles was 
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entitled "Important Aspects of Latin-American Relationships 
and International Agreements." Among other issues, this 
particular article discussed U.S.-Mexican relations and 
stated that "the attitude of the United States toward 
Mexico to-day is essentially as stated by President 
Buchanan in his second annual message to Congress in 1858:" 
The northern boundary of Mexico is coincident with 
our own southern boundary from ocean to ocean, and we 
must necessarily feel a deep interest in all that 
concerns the well-being and fate of so near a 
neighbor. We have always cherished the kindest 
wishes for the success of that Republic, and have 
indulged the hope that it might at last, after all 
its trials, enjoy peace and prosperity, under a free 
and stable government. We have never hitherto 
interfered directly or indirectly, with its internal 
affairs, and it is a duty which we owe to ourselves 
to protect the integrity of its territory against the 
hostile interference of any other Power. Our 
geographical position, our direct interest in all 
that concerns Mexico, and our well-settled policy in 
regard to the North American continent render this an 
indispensable duty. 133 
The year 1927 ended with Dwight w. Morrow in place as 
the American Ambassador to Mexico, the Nicaraguan crisis 
had cooled, and the petroleum industry in Mexico entered 
into a period of decline. Despite a great deal of rhetoric 
difficulty may arise from Mexican appreciation of the fact 
that there is very little sentiment favourable to 
intervention in this country." 
133Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 26, weekly 
Summary for November 12-25, 1927, 11868. 
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and posturing, the United States did not intervene 
militarily in Mexico during the twenties. However, the 
U.S. did maintain its economic dominance over that country. 
For the Military Intelligence Division, it was successful 
in maintaining its watchful presence in Mexico, alert to 
any possible danger to the United States. 
CHAPTER III 
U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN MEXICO: 
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this quantitative analysis is to 
identify the focus and priorities of the U.S. Military 
Intelligence Division relative to Mexico during the years 
1917-1927, by calculating the amount of coverage given to 
various topics (i.e., military operations, politics, 
economics, foreign relations). Although limited in scope 
(MID records contained in the National Archives are 
extensive) , the results of this quantitative analysis 
should serve as a fair indicator of the emphasis placed by 
the MID on various components of its surveillance of 
Mexico. 1 The documents and reports generated by the MID 
during this time helped to shape and define the U.S. 
government's perspective and concept of the reality of 
Mexico. 2 
1Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 1, xii. 
Record Group 165 alone consists of over 4,200 boxes of 
documents and records for just the period 1919-1939. There 
are also other record groups that contain military 
intelligence reports. 
2Ibid., vi. The daily and weekly summaries produced 
by the MID were circulated to the Chief of Staff, 
Department of State, and the President. 
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It is important to demonstrate the priorities of 
military intelligence in order to gain a fuller 
understanding of the context within which it was operating. 
The Military Intelligence Division was concerned with 
national security and the possibility of threats emanating 
from Mexico. Those threats could take the form of German 
espionage and sabotage against the United States, Japanese 
commercial dominance or military invasion, Mexican 
revolutionary activity that might endanger American 
business interests in Mexico, or the spread of labor 
agitation or radicalism into the United States. The MID 
was focused on Mexico (despite other hot spots in the 
world) because of its common border with the United States. 
A quantitative analysis is used in this study in 
order to provide statistical evidence on which to draw 
appropriate conclusions. In addition, this type of 
analysis connotes a degree of scientific objectivity, as 
well as providing a vivid picture of the content of a large 
number of documents. The term quantitative analysis as 
used in this particular study is based upon the following 
definition: "quantitative content analysis substitutes 
controlled observation and systematic counting for 
impressionistic ways of observing frequencies of 
occurrence." 3 Basically, the intent of this quantitative 
3Alexander L. George, "Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches to Content Analysis," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, 
ed., Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana: University of 
analysis is to identify and tabulate the various topic 
categories contained within the selected military 
intelligence reports and documents. The frequency and 
percentage of the various topic categories are tabulated 
72 
for each time era described in the previous chapter: 1917-
1918; 1919-1920; 1921-1927. 
The quantitative analysis in this study used a sample 
of documents drawn from the following primary sources: 1) 
Richard Challener's thirty volume collection containing 
twenty-six volumes of weekly intelligence summaries and 
four volumes of daily summaries for the period 1917-1927; 
2) Dale Reynolds' microfilm collection containing 
approximately 9,000 pages of documents for the period 1919-
1941; and 3) a sample of documents from the National 
Archives in Washington, D.C., selected by this researcher. 
All documents are copies of military intelligence reports 
contained in the National Archives, specifically Record 
Group 165, War Department General Staff, Military 
Intelligence Division. 
The sample drawn for this quantitative analysis 
utilized all 254 weekly and thirty-nine daily summaries 
(100%) relating to Mexico contained within the Challener 
collection covering the years 1917-1927. The Reynolds' 
Illinois Press, 1959), 8; quoted in Richard E. Beringer, 
Historical Analysis: Contemporary Approaches to Clio's 
Craft (New York: Wiley, 1978; reprint, Malabar, FL: Robert 
E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1986), 221. 
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collection contained 272 documents for the years 1919-1927. 
The 182 documents (67%) used from the Reynolds' collection 
were selected based upon the readability of printed 
microfilm copies {the quality of some of the microfilm 
frames, as well as the quality of the microfilm printer 
available to the researcher left something to be desired) . 
This researcher had the opportunity to make two trips 
to Washington, D.C., in connection with professional 
association activities. Several visits were made to the 
National Archives to conduct research on this topic. 
Originally, I was conducting research for a seminar paper, 
so I randomly selected documents covering the period 1910-
1940. During my second visit, the focus was narrowed to 
the period 1917-1927. In all, I was able to secure copies 
of seventy-six documents from Record Group 165 for the 
period of this study. 
Thus, the comprehensive sample drawn for this study 
reflects a plausible and systematic approach toward 
securing a representative sample of documents. The number 
of documents selected from the microfilm collection and the 
National Archives was limited due to time constraints, 
access to archive materials, readability of microfilm 
records, and cost considerations. The intent of this study 
is to provide a model of analysis that can be used by other 
researchers for more extensive studies. 
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THE WAR YEARS, 1917-1918 
The first set of documents to be analyzed are the 
weekly summaries for the two years 1917-1918. The weekly 
summaries were not started until June, 1917, thus the first 
year contains only six months of coverage. The format, 
structure, and content of the summaries changed over time, 
so that consistency of analysis by researchers is made more 
challenging. For the most part, I have used the same topic 
headings as contained in the summaries, in some cases I 
have grouped topics under headings that make more sense to 
me. The results of my survey of the weekly summaries for 
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Intelligence Division reported during the war years, it is 
not surprising to see that the top three topic categories, 
comprising seventy percent of the individual topic reports, 
deal with foreign relations, military operations, and the 
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internal stability of Mexico. 4 It must be remembered that 
the U.S. Army, under the guise of Pershing's Punitive 
Expedition, had just pulled out of Mexico early in 1917. 
Thus, the U.S. government was sensitive about the 
possibility of armed bands of rebels or revolutionary 
movements along the border. The war also heightened the 
anxiety level of American citizens and the military 
regarding the possibility of German spies and saboteurs 
crossing the border from Mexico into the United States. 
From the results of this first table, it appears that 
the Military Intelligence Division (understandably jittery 
during the war) placed a high priority on national security 
when conducting surveillance of Mexico. Whether a 
potential haven for German spies or a Mexican revolution 
that might spill violently over into the U.S. or even the 
possibility of a Japanese invasion from Mexico into the 
U.S., Mexico could not be trusted alone without the 
watchful eyes of the MID standing guard over her. 
In the next table, we see the results from the daily 
sunnnaries for the year 1918. Table II is com.posed of all 
4The MID used the topic category of "General 
Situation" or "Internal Situation" as a general update on 
conditions within Mexico during that reporting period. 
Under this general heading would be information on rebel 
activities, military operations, public opinion, stability 
of the national government, economic conditions, and a 
whole host of related topics. The whole section could 
easily have been divided into more specific topic 
categories. This may be a reflection of the experience 
levels (or lack thereof) of the early intelligence 
officers. 
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twenty-eight daily summary reports contained in volumes 27-
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One of the unanswered questions regarding Table II is 
whether the twenty-eight daily sunnnaries contained here 
represent the total number produced on Mexico for 1918 or 
whether they represent a sample of reports for the year? 
Acknowledging that unanswered question, I will still make 
several points concerning Table II. First, military 
affairs top the list of concerns, with emphasis on both 
rebel activities and federal forces. As stated earlier, 
this is not surprising since the war was raging in Europe 
throughout the year. Second, the next three areas 
(economic, political, and connnunication) are separated from 
the number one topic by approximately the same percentage 
points as in Table I. Third, the real surprise is the low 
emphasis given to foreign relations/nationals as compared 
to the results of Table I. In addition, the emphasis on 
foreign relations is focused on relations with the U.S., 
rather than German activities. 
The final set of documents centering on the war years 
of 1917-18 are composed of documents selected by this 
researcher from the National Archives. Table III 
sunnnarizes the results from the forty-seven documents used 
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Although this sample of documents from the National 
Archives was not scientifically drawn, it does resemble the 
first two tables in some aspects. Like Table I, the number 
one topic category shown in Table III is that of foreign 
relations/nationals. The difference between the two 
tables, however, is that the emphasis in Table I is on 
German activities in Mexico, while Table III (like Table 
II) focuses on relations between the U.S. and Mexico. 
Similar to the other two tables, Table III has the 
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political situation and communication in the middle. 
Another surprise though, is that military affairs is at the 
bottom of Table III, unlike the other two tables. 
What can be said about these three sets of documents 
generated by military intelligence during the years of 
World War One? In all three cases, the number one topic 
was either military affairs or foreign relations. In light 
of the war, this does not appear surprising. Taken 
together, military affairs and foreign relations 
constituted 45.3 percent of the topics in Table I, 46.9 
percent of the topics in Table II, and 70.2 percent of the 
topics in Table III. 
The internal political and economic situation of 
Mexico was not given the same degree of emphasis as the 
military and foreign situation. Taken together, political 
and economic concerns constituted 24.5 percent of the 
topics in Table I, 39.8 percent of the topics in Table II, 
and 12.8 percent of the topics in Table III. 
The topic area of communication could be interchanged 
with the military heading of psychological. This is an 
amorphous category that touches upon such tenuous subjects 
as attitudes, morale, psychological warfare, persuasion, 
opinions, and espionage. Communication deals with both 
internal and external conditions, as well as military 
matters. Taken alone, this topic ranges between a low of 
8.5 percent of the topics in Table III to a high of 13.3 
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percent of the topics in Table II. 
Another topic that is difficult to define is that of 
the general/internal situation in Mexico. In some reports, 
separate headings for military, political, or economic 
concerns were not given. Instead, a general update of 
conditions existing for that time period was given. Taken 
alone, this topic ranges from zero in Table II to a high of 
21.6 percent in Table I. 
The results of these tables provide critical evidence 
that the Military Intelligence Division focused more 
attention and placed greater emphasis upon military 
operations, foreign affairs, rebel activities, and border 
events, rather than the internal political, economic, and 
social structures of Mexico. I would argue that these 
internal structures and cultural processes could have gone 
a long way toward providing critical insight into the 
intentions and stability of the Mexican state during World 
War One. It appears that the MID, in its zeal to protect 
the United States from foreign threats, overestimated the 
potential for danger to the U.S. from Mexico. 
Consequently, the relationship between these two countries 
suffered from heightened levels of anxiety and antagonism, 
which extended beyond the years of this study. 
IMMEDIATE POSTWAR YEARS, 1919-1920 
The next three tables focus on the immediate postwar 
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years of 1919-20. Like the three previous tables, these 
next three were drawn from the same primary sources, with 
the addition of the microfilm collection combined with the 
National Archive sample. 
In Table IV, we go back to the weekly summaries found 
in the Challener collection, but for the years 1919-20. 
During this particular time period, there were a total of 
100 weekly summaries generated by the MID that were 
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It is interesting to note that this time period of 
1919-1920 contains the largest number of weekly summaries 
pertaining to Mexico in the Challener collection. In terms 
of Mexican surveillance, the Military Intelligence Division 
was busy indeed. In contrast to the preceding war years, 
Table IV demonstrates that the largest topic category 
during 1919-1920 was the internal 
political/industrial/economic situation with 43.3 percent 
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of the topic reports. Unlike other years, during 1919-20 
the political and economic areas were lumped together 
·rather than kept as separate topics. However, this broad 
category was closely followed by the military category with 
38.1 percent. A distant third was the foreign relations 
area with 6.6 percent. 
Why this shift in emphasis from the war years? One 
possibility might lie in the sweeping hysteria gripping the 
United States at this time, with alarm over the perceived 
worldwide spread of Bolshevism, radicalism, labor 
movements, and the instability of national governments in 
the wake of world War One. The MID saw in Mexico a 
reflection of their own concern with the possible 
instability of the United States relative to the views and 
actions of various radical and labor groups. 
Table v contains the smallest number of reports in 
this analysis. There were eleven daily summaries 
pertaining to Mexico produced by the MID, reflecting the 
time period January through April, 1919. These are 
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Since Table v represents the results of only eleven 
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summary reports and only four months of the year, its 
significance is somewhat limited. The largest category is 
the internal economic situation with 36.9 percent of the 
topic reports, followed closely by the military situation 
with 29.2 percent. Actually, the results of Table v are 
very close to those of Table IV. The political and 
economic category for Table IV is 43.3 percent, in Table v 
it is 47.7 percent. In combining the military and foreign 
relations topic areas, the result for Table IV is 44.7 
percent and the result for Table V is 44.6 percent. 
Although limited in sample size, the results of Table v 
tend to reinforce and support the results of Table IV. 
The final table for the 1919-1920 era is Table VI, 
which makes use of reports from both the National Archives 
sample and from the Reynolds' microfilm collection of 
documents. Although the actual number of reports is 
relatively small, a total of twenty-seven, each one 
contains a great deal of information. 
TABLE VI 


























































































The overall results of Table VI are similar to those 
found in Tables IV and v, although the individual rankings 
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are different. Unlike the other two tables, the results of 
Table VI demonstrate that military matters are ranked 
first, as opposed to the internal political and economic 
situations. However, like the other two tables, the 
military category combined with foreign relations/nationals 
is equal to 50.7 percent, which is similar to the 44.7 
percent of Table IV and 44.6 percent of Table v. Likewise, 
the combination of the political and economic categories 
for Table VI is 43.1 percent, compared to 43.3 percent for 
Table IV and 47.7 percent for Table v. 
The results of Tables IV through VI demonstrate a 
differing trend from that found in Tables I through III. 
The second set of tables (IV-VI) show an equalization of 
emphasis on the internal political and economic situation, 
along with the military and foreign relations realm. One 
explanation for this phenomenon could be the ending of 
hostilities in Europe. Another explanation might be the 
growing concern over the worldwide increase in radical and 
labor activities that could negatively impact national 
governments and political stability. A third explanation 
might be the growing sophistication of military 
intelligence reporting and analysis, attempting to provide 
a better balance of perspective. Whatever the explanation, 
real differences in reporting emphasis do exist for these 
two periods of time. 
However, are these differences in emphasis or 
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priorities significant or superficial? I would argue that 
for these two time periods, 1917-18 and 1919-20, the 
differences are superficial. They are superficial because 
the MID continued to focus on external activities and 
quantitative measurements, as opposed to the internal 
structure and culture of Mexico. The priority and the 
emphasis continued to be on federal troop movements, rebel 
leaders and activities, military operations, political 
leaders, radical and labor activities, revenues, and 
various economic indicators. 
THE TWENTIES, 1921-1927 
The next two tables reflect a longer period of time 
than seen in the first six tables. Although there was 
still a great deal of activity taking place in 1921, it is 
during this six year period that the Military Intelligence 
Division experienced a significant downturn in personnel 
and resources. This fact is reflected in the number of 
intelligence reports generated by the MID. By the late 
fall of 1921, the MID abandoned its practice of producing 
worldwide weekly sununaries and adopted a biweekly format. 5 
Table VII contains the results drawn from a total 
number of ninety-two weekly and biweekly sununaries 
concerning Mexico produced during the 1921-1927 period. 
Nearly half (45) of the sununaries were produced during 1921 
5Challener, Military Intelligence, Vol. 21, v. 
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The results from Table VII reinforce the trend that 
began during the 1919-1920 years, where the combination of 
the military and foreign relations categories are roughly 
equal to the combination of the political and economic 
categories. Although there is not much difference in the 
emphasis placed upon individual topics within the military 
category compared to previous years, there are some real 
differences relative to the other categories. 
In the political area, it is interesting to see the 
heavy emphasis placed on regional and local governments, as 
well as on radical groups during the twenties as opposed to 
the earlier years. This might be a reflection of the 
growing stability of the national government during the 
twenties compared to the violence of earlier years. 
In the economic arena, Table VII reflects the growing 
importance being placed upon oil production and labor 
relations by industrial countries like the United States. 
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The U.S. was very much concerned with the possible 
nationalization of oil companies as mandated by the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917. 
In the area of foreign relations, Table VII points to 
the growing relationship and interdependence between the 
United States and Mexico. It is during the twenties that 
the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico began to take 
on new dimensions relative to economic and diplomatic 
matters, for example, the issues of trade agreements and 
official recognition of Mexico by the United States, as 
opposed to threats of direct military intervention. 
The last table to be displayed in this quantitative 
analysis is Table VIII. This table is composed of 
documents drawn from both the National Archives and the 
Reynolds' microfilm collection for the years 1921-1927. 
There are 164 microfilm reports and 20 archive reports 
represented in this table. There are microfilm reports for 
each year (1921-27), but the archive reports cover only the 
years 1921, 1922, and 1924. 
TABLE VIII 
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Total Number of Archive & Microfilm Reports = 184 
The results of Table VIII do differ from those of 
3.1% 
100% 
Table VII. Although military concerns are the number one 
topic of both tables, in Table VIII the military 
constitutes 44.0 percent of the topic reports, while in 
Table VII the military constitutes 35.6 percent of the 
reports. The political and foreign relations topic 
categories are relatively close, but a major difference 
exists in the economic area. In Table VII, the economic 
area comprises 16.7 percent, but in Table VIII it only 
comprises 3.1 percent. This discrepancy might be the 
result of document sample selection, as opposed to 
significant differences in actual priorities. 
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Throughout the 1921-1927 period, as demonstrated by 
the above tables, the Military Intelligence Division 
continued to focus on external events and activities in all 
realms: military, political, economic, foreign relations, 
and communications. The MID tended to place priority on 
"what" happened, as opposed to "why did it happen?" Again, 
it is the external features, rather than the internal and 
cultural structures that formed the basis of the Mexican 
reality as created and perceived by the MID. 
SUMMARY 
I would argue that this quantitative analysis of 
military intelligence is a reliable indicator of what the 
priorities of the Military Intelligence Division were 
during the period 1917-1927. In terms of the military 
surveillance of Mexico, I think that the key priorities 
included: the monitoring and tracking of military forces, 
rebel activities, actual and potential leaders, levels of 
violence, political stability, economic potential, 
activities along the Mexican-U.S. border, and the 
relationship between Mexico and foreign powers. 
95 
Little attention was devoted to describing and 
understanding the internal structure of Mexico or the inner 
workings of Mexican life and culture. Scant data was 
produced that might provide a historical, anthropological, 
or sociological understanding of the Mexican peoples. 
Intelligence reports did include information about 
education, religion, customs, and society, but it tended to 
be obscured in ethnocentric language and disconnected from 
the importance attached to the bureaucratic world of the 
military and the political state. For example, military 
intelligence misunderstood the concept of revolutionary 
nationalism and the Mexican yearning for national 
sovereignty. 
According to one historian, speaking on the issue of 
intelligence theories and describing various causes of 
intelligence failure, "the most obvious reason for 
intelligence failure is lack of knowledge." This lack of 
knowledge: 
may take the form of absence of elementary 
information about a certain country or a certain 
problem from lack of interest, or for other reasons. 
Vital information may not be forthcoming because of 
wrong priorities. A nation preoccupied with internal 
problems may not be curious about foreign affairs and 
might regard them as unwelcomed intrusions on its 
main concerns. Between the two world wars, America 
lacked an intelligence service; its policy makers 
derived their knowledge about the outside world from 
the dispatches of ambassadors and, of course, the 
daily press. 6 
6Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and 
Limits of Intelligence, (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 281. 
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I would agree with the assessment that intelligence 
failure can come from an "absence of elementary 
information" or "wrong priorities." I do disagree with the 
statement that "America lacked an intelligence service." 
The United States did have an active intelligence service 
between the two world wars, although a small one, as 
described in the previous chapter. The point to be made 
here is that in the case of Mexico, the Military 
Intelligence Division lacked sufficient information about 
the Mexican state and its people. This resulted from the 
fact that its priorities about Mexico were wrong. Thus, 
the U.S. perspective of the reality of Mexico was 
distorted. 
CHAPTER IV 
U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN MEXICO: 
A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical framework for this chapter is based 
upon the results of several studies dealing with culture 
and international relations. Specifically, I have utilized 
the findings of Edward Said, Akira Iriye, Edward Stewart 
and Milton Bennett. Although their studies do not address 
Mexico itself, I believe that the cross-cultural 
perspectives of Said, Iriye, Stewart and Bennett can be 
appropriately applied to the relationship between Mexico 
and the United States. Ranging from the theoretical to the 
pragmatic, these cross-cultural perspectives will inform 
the reader concerning the Military Intelligence Division 
mindset relative to the surveillance of Mexico. 
For purposes of this chapter, I am using Richard 
Beringer's definition of literary analysis as a definition 
for textual analysis: "it involves reading source material 
and deriving evidence from that material to be used in 
supporting a point of view or thesis." 1 I am using the 
term "textual" rather than "literary" because the source 
1Beringer, Historical Analysis, 18. 
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material involves intelligence reports and documents rather 
than works of literature. However, the methodology is the 
same. The methodology employed in this chapter includes 
the identification of themes, discussion, and the support 
of conclusions through the use of examples. 
The textual analysis used in this chapter was 
performed on selected documents utilized in the 
quantitative analysis of the previous chapter. This 
textual analysis demonstrates more clearly the prevailing 
attitudes, perspectives, and world views of the Military 
Intelligence Division toward the Mexican state and its 
peoples. This chapter provides evidence that the 
ethnocentrism of the MID got in the way of painting an 
accurate portrait of the reality of Mexico during the years 
from 1917 to 1927. 
How did cultural differences influence the content of 
military intelligence in respect to Mexico? This critical 
and essential question will be addressed by analyzing the 
words, concepts, paradigms, and patterns of examination 
found within the selected intelligence reports. The 
cultural themes explored include: action and doing, 
quantification and facts, materialism, competition and 
measurable achievements, focus on individuals, future 
orientation, mindset, and ethnocentrism. 
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ACTION AND DOING 
According to Stewart and Bennett, it is easy for 
foreign visitors to the United States to conclude that 
"doing is the dominant activity for Americans." They also 
state that "all aspects of American life are affected by 
the predominance of doing. 112 This American orientation 
toward action is composed of several elements: decision 
making, problem solving, causes, individuals and choice. 3 
The following military intelligence report is a good 
example of the American orientation toward action and 
doing. For the week ending June 9, 1917, the Military 
Intelligence Division reported that "in 28 of the 31 states 
and territories of Mexico, rebel forces are at the present 
writing more or less active." In the same report, it was 
stated that "as a result of the vigorous campaign carried 
on against Villa beginning in April and lasting through 
May, his forces are nearing disintegration." This same 
report estimated the total number of rebel forces at 
between 65,000 and 85,000 at the end of January. Still 
later in the report, the political situation in Mexico is 
described: 
The Carranza Government appears to be meeting with 
less opposition than formerly. Relations with the 
United States are improving. Our vigorous action in 
preparing for war and in providing men and money has 
2Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 69. 
3Ibid. I 62-69. 
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made a deep impression in Mexico. 4 
The focus of the above report is on action and doing, 
specifically on the activities of the rebels in opposition 
to the Carranza government. The desire to identify active 
decision making and problem solving is reflected by the 
report's notice of a "vigorous campaign" against Villa. In 
reality, the MID was premature in predicting Villa's demise 
at this time and the described actions were not 
interpreted. 
Another element of the action orientation is that of 
cause. Every action must have a cause. In this case, the 
improved relations between the United States and Mexico was 
caused by "our vigorous action in preparing for war and in 
providing men and money." According to the MID, this 
massive military build-up made a "deep impression in 
Mexico." 
The following excerpt, with a focus on action, comes 
from a MID weekly sunnnary that was based on a New York 
Times article from August 23, 1919 that reported on the 
"possibility of American intervention in Mexico." In turn, 
the Times article was based on an article appearing in the 
ABC newspaper of Mexico City, "which is said to have 
created something of a sensation in the southern Republic." 
The original article pointed out seven ways in which the 
4Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 1, Weekly 
Sunnnary for June 9, 1917, 11-12. 
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United States might intervene in Mexico and discusses each 
at length. The seven types of intervention listed were: 
[1] Complete invasion, which the paper admits would 
result in victory for the United States. 
[2] Partial invasion by seizure of frontier posts 
and customs houses, which it said would weaken the 
Carranza Government, causing a spreading of the 
rebellion, dishearten the Constitutionalists, and 
cause "Carranza and his system to topple like a pack 
of cards." 
[3] Aiding or recognizing some rebel group. 
[4] Naming of a group of Mexicans and assisting 
them in the formation of a government. 
[S] Withdrawal of recognition from the present 
Government, which the paper said would be tantamount 
to recognition of the rebels. 
[6] Presenting an ultimatum to the Government 
requiring assurances that the rebellion would be 
ended within a definite period, payment of foreign 
claims within a prescribed time, resumption of 
foreign debt service, and final disposition of the 
petroleum question. The paper said the present 
Government could not give these guarantees. 
[7] Acting as arbiter between the contending 
Mexican factions. Nothing could come of arbitration, 
the paper said, adding that the present Government 
would "deem it beneath its di~nity to enter into any 
negotiations with its enemy." 
The cultural emphasis here is on the possible actions 
that could be undertaken by the United States to intervene 
in Mexico, not the reality in the Mexican field. It is 
evident from this report that the MID was clearly 
interested in the topic of intervention by the United 
States in Mexico. In addition, the MID assessed a number 
of options, all of which included some form of action by 
the United States. 
The following report addresses the question of 
5Ibid., vol. 9, September 6, 1919, 1714. 
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official recognition of Mexico by the United States. This 
complicated issue was a constant source of tension between 
the two countries. For the United States, the problem was 
intimately linked to the actions of Mexican government. The 
recognition question is addressed in the following MID 
weekly summary: 
There is a noticeable change in the attitude of the 
Mexican Government toward recognition by the United 
States in that there now appears for the first time 
evidence of a serious intention to comply, at least 
outwardly, with the American requirement that the 
good will of the present government be demonstrated 
in deeds rather than words. Until recently all 
effort seemed to be directed toward forcing a 
modification of the requirements for American 
recognition through an extensive campaign of 
propaganda. 6 
In the above example, the MID predilection for action 
is demonstrated through the expression "deeds rather than 
words." The Mexican government is praised for making a 
choice between propaganda and action. It is clearly 
evident that actions by the Mexican government would make a 
much greater impact upon the United States as opposed to 
futile attempts at propaganda. In terms of power and 
authority relationships, this example points out the much 
stronger bargaining position of the United States over that 
of Mexico. 
Throughout the entire period of 1917-1927, the 
Military Intelligence Division never turned its attention 
away from the revolutionary movements and rebel activities 
6Ibid., vol. 21, September 1922, 9527. 
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occurring in Mexico. Again, the cultural paradigm of 
action and doing is tied to these revolutionary movements 
and rebel activities. The following weekly sunnnary from 
1923 addresses this issue: 
Mexico is again in the throes of a revolution of 
such serious proportions as to threaten the overthrow 
of the existing government ... 
The chief political figures involved are General 
Plutarco Elias Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta, the 
two principal opposing candidates for the presidency 
in the 1924 campaign ... 
It is too early to attempt a forecast of what 
proportions the present rebel movement may assume or 
what the ultimate outcome may be. The controlling 
factor rests entirely on the loyalty or disloyalty of 
the Federal military forces ... 
Military operations thus far have been 
characterized by much maneuvering on both sides 
combined with a manifest disinclination for decisive 
battle ... 7 
The above report focuses on both rebel activities and 
the relative position of the two leading political 
contenders in the upcoming elections. As in other 
intelligence reports, this report follows the same trend of 
placing greater priority on military operations (action and 
doing), as opposed to exploring the reasons behind all the 
revolutionary activity. The primary emphasis is on the 
various actions, not reasons, causes, or interpretations. 
QUANTIFICATION AND FACTS 
According to Stewart and Bennett, "the American 
conception of facts," as well as the quantification and 
7Ibid., vol. 22, December 15-28, 1923, 9974-9977. 
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uses of facts are not universal across cultures. Stewart 
and Bennett explain that the American concept of fact 
contains the following elements: 
First, facts possess perceptual content; they are 
empirical, observable, and measurable. Second, facts 
are reliable so that different observers will agree 
about them. Third, facts are objective and therefore 
valid .... Fourth, both the reliability and validity of 
facts are associated with measurements using 
coordinates of time and space, leading Americans to 
speak of "historical" but not "future" facts. 8 
Also, facts are "impersonal and exist separately from 
perceptual processes and from observers. In American 
thinking, facts exist in the external world and not inside 
the mind. "9 
The following intelligence report attempted to 
explain in a factual manner why large numbers of Mexicans 
were leaving the United States in order to return to 
Mexico: 
32. 
It is reported from El Paso that the exodus of 
Mexicans from the United States continues. 
There are many causes to which this may be 
attributed. 
(1) The United States is at war with a foreign 
country. 
(2) The high cost of living in the United States. 
(3) The fact that free transportation is being given 
to Mexicans from Juarez to Chihuahua. 
(4) German propaganda on the same subject. 
(5) The fact that conditions in Mexico are more 
peaceful today than they have been for some time 
past, and every Mexican desires to return to his 
8Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 31-
9Ibid., 32. 
native land. 10 
The above report attempted to present factual 
information on the border situation as it existed during 
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1917, but it failed to paint a complete picture of reality 
because it neglected to mention the wartime realities that 
actually existed along the Mexican-u.s. border. The 
reality was that, along the border, as in other parts of 
the United States, there was a resurgence of nativism and 
hysteria that brought down "the wrath and hatred of wartime 
America" upon aliens and others suspected of anti-
Americanism, Bolshevism, radicalism, or espionage. 11 The 
reality along the border consisted of discrimination, 
racism, and violence. No wonder people wanted to leave. 
The MID failed to mention this particular version of 
reality in its assessment of the facts. The MID 
"factualized" a complex situation into non-emotional, 
tangible paradigms. 
In 1918, as in other years, the Military Intelligence 
Division reported on the question of American military 
intervention in Mexico. In the following report, the 
rationale for U.S. intervention was linked to countering 
German activity in Mexico, rather than chasing Mexican 
bandits. In an intelligence report for the week ending 
10challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 1, Weekly 
Summary for June 23, 1917, 15. 
11Raat, Revoltosos, 256-258. 
106 
February 9, 1918, it was stated: 
According to an observer recently in Sonora, it is 
stated that the conviction is growing that the United 
States is merely awaiting a favorable opportunity to 
spring upon the Mexicans. All well informed Mexicans 
believe that a conflict with the United States is 
inevitable and among some the conviction is growing 
that Mexico should strike first. 12 
In the above report, we see that conclusions are 
drawn by the MID concerning the attitudes and convictions 
of "all well informed Mexicans." These conclusions are 
considered legitimate because they are based upon facts 
generated by the observer. There appears to be no hint of 
questioning the validity of the conclusions that are drawn, 
even though the reliability of the observer is not made 
known and generalizations about the attitudes of an ill-
defined population are treated as fact. It appears that 
the MID belief in "facts" was stronger than reality. 
The emphasis upon facts is reflected in the following 
comments from a 1918 intelligence report. During the 
previous year, a number of intelligence reports had made 
mention about the "peacefulness" being observed in Mexico 
and the control being maintained by President Carranza over 
Mexico. However, we see that in 1918 the situation had 
somehow changed: "Mexico is more generally restless than 
it has been for some time." The Military Intelligence 
Division reported that Jalisco and Michoacan "are 
12Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 3, Weekly 
Summary for February 9, 1918, 13. 
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practically controlled by anti-Carrancistas;" and that in 
Vera Cruz, Felix D:laz "is keeping the country in turmoil, 
apparently in order to be able to take advantage of any 
collapse of the Government. "13 
It is interesting to note that in the above comments, 
the MID did not attempt to explain nor try to understand 
the underlying reasons for the increased fact of rebel 
activity taking place at this time. Although the MID was 
attempting to provide an objective assessment of the 
Mexican situation, there appears to be a hint of hysteria 
in these comments regarding the possible gains being made 
by the rebels. The facts are never questioned. 
The following report is a striking example of the 
American preference for quantification and facts. In this 
particular instance, the discussion takes place early in 
1919 and is centered on the possibility of U.S. 
intervention in Mexico. In this intelligence report, the 
MID had the following to say: 
An increasingly large native element in Mexico is 
beginning to look forward to foreign intervention in 
a spirit of hopeful anticipation, or, at worst, of 
resignation. Postal censorship extracts from social 
correspondence since the signing of the armistice 
furnish striking evidence of this. Apparently the 
conviction is growing in the southern Republic that 
there can be no hope of relief from within and that 
conditions, which are with the greatest frequency 
described as "intolerable," will not be remedied 
unless assistance be given by the United States, 
acting alone or in conjunction with some of the 
European powers which have great material interests 
13Ibid., March 9, 1918, 38. 
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in Mexico. 
Testimony continues to accumulate in contradiction 
to the widely theory that foreign intervention can be 
accomplished in Mexico only by breaking the 
resistance of a united and bitterly hostile people. 14 
In the above example, intelligence "fact" comes in 
the form of "postal censorship extracts." By intercepting 
a number of pieces of mail, the American orientation toward 
quantification gave statistical validity to social 
correspondence. According to Stewart and Bennett, "when 
human behavior is also quantified, it becomes objective and 
can be treated like other controllable environmental 
forces." 15 The second source of intelligence "fact" in 
this example comes in the form of "testimony." This too is 
quantified and becomes objective fact. Thus, the facts 
override any consideration that might be given to the 
cultural differences between the United States and Mexico, 
let alone the cultural differences between and among the 
various populations existing within Mexico. 
The American fascination for numbers is reflected in 
the following excerpt from a 1920 intelligence report. In 
this particular report, a "confidential informant" provided 
information concerning the number of airplanes in Mexico. 
The informant indicated that there was a total of "fifty" 
planes throughout the whole of Mexico. It is significant 
14 Ibid., vol. 6, January 4, 1919, 397. 
15Stewart and Bennett, Cultural Patterns, 127. 
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to note that the MID did not reconcile the discrepancy in 
the numbers because at the conclusion of the report, it was 
noted that: 
Information on file in the M.I.D. gives the total 
number of airplanes now in combat service in Mexico 
as fourteen. There are several planes being used 
for training purposes at the Balbuena airdrome. 16 
In 1920 the Military Intelligence Division attempted 
to analyze the dynamic nature of Mexican politics by 
providing a written summary based upon historical facts. 
The following report provides a typical MID analysis of 
Mexican politics: 
Politics as they exist in Mexico to-day is the 
outgrowth of the May and April revolution, which 
resulted in the overthrow of Carranza, his subsequent 
death, and of the establishment of a provisional 
government with de la Huerta as Provisional 
President. 
To understand this movement one must go back to 
last July .... 17 
This particular example demonstrates the lack of any long-
term historical perspective and understanding of the 
Mexican state or Mexican politics. Instead, it focuses on 
irrnnediate events that can be quantified and tied in a 
linear fashion to the present. In terms of root causes for 
the revolution, the report assigns chief blame to Obregon, 
but offers no analysis based upon historical factors. 
The following intelligence report is from the 
16Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 12, Weekly 
Surrnnary for March 6, 1920, 3217. 
17Ibid., vol. 14, July 21, 1920, 5116-5120. 
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military attache in Mexico City. This particular report 
summarizes the provisions of the "Ley de Patente" (License 
Law) which was recently passed in the state of Puebla 
resulting in a number of civil disturbances. Among other 
issues, the report states: 
It is obvious that any executive having 
discretionary power under the law to fix the monthly 
tax of a company at any sum between $50. Pesos and 
$25,000 Pesos, has wide potentialities for arbitrary 
action, if he should see fit to exercise them ... 
In further illustration of conditions prevailing in 
Puebla under the present administration, the 
following facts received at first hand from a 
reliable source are given: 18 
Again, the word "fact" is used in order to obscure the 
impossibility of being specific about the tax situation. 
For a number of years, the Military Intelligence 
Division had expressed concern over Japanese activities in 
Mexico and the possibility of an alliance between Japan and 
Mexico. In the following example, conclusions were based 
upon evidence that was deemed factual according the 
standards of the MID: 
There are several indications that point to the 
possibility of an alliance between Japan and Mexico. 
In addition to the individuals already reported as 
being here for the purpose of obtaining oil 
concessions in Oaxaca and the Commission now believed 
on its way for the purpose of investigating 
colonization possibilities, there are, in addition, 
two Australians (?), representing a Japanese 
newspaper in the City .... A reliable informant states 
that the Japanese have a concession in the San Luis 
18G-2 Report: Political Information, November 18, 
1921; File No. 2711; (UPA Microfilm, roll 1, frames 135-
137); Mexico, 1919-1941; MID; RG 165; NA. 
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Valley, Lower California, not far from Magdalena Bay. 
The advantages to the Japanese of striking oil in 
this locality are obvious. 
It has been noted that the Japanese are very 
punctilious in their attendance at all official 
functions. While it is presumed that the Japanese 
diplomatic representation make a special point of 
attending these functions, this practice is very 
pronounced here at present. It is perhaps not too 
much to interpret it as an indication of their 
desire to be on the best possible terms with the 
Mexicans. 19 
The above report is a good example of the MID basing 
its conclusions upon disparate facts. Giving credit to the 
investigative abilities of the MID, Japan and Mexico did 
sign a treaty of Amity, Conunerce and Navigation on October 
8, 1924. However, it was only a conunercial treaty which 
superseded a previous one signed November 30, 1888. 20 It 
was not the military alliance which some had feared. The 
MID reached conclusions based upon "facts" without 
understanding the cultural dynamics taking place between 
the Japanese and the Mexicans in this situation. 
The following report reflects the concern of the 
Military Intelligence Division during 1927 regarding the 
level of military action and rebellion taking place in 
Mexico. As shown in earlier examples, the following report 
19G-2 Report: Foreign Relations - Japan, September 23, 
1924; File No. 4933; (UPA Microfilm, roll 1, frame 475); 
Mexico, 1919-1941; MID; RG 165; NA. 
20G-2 Report: Foreign Relations - Japanese Activities 
in Mexico: Treaty of Amity, Conunerce, and Navigation, 
October 9,1924; File No. 4974; (UPA Microfilm, roll 1, 
frames 478-494); Mexico, 1919-1941; MID; RG 165; NA. 
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demonstrates the emphasis placed on statistics and facts. 
This particular report was submitted by Major Harold 
Thompson, Acting Military Attache in Mexico City, and was 
based on information from several sources: consular 
reports, the press, and confidential informants. Thompson 
states: 
Since the date of last report ... , there have been 
42 encounters and skirmishes between the rebels and 
Federal forces with new centers of rebellion noted in 
Chihuahua, zacatecas, Aguascalientes, and San Luis 
Potosi. The War Department of date of April 4th 
officially announced that rebellion actually exists 
in the States of Sonora, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Colima 
and Guerrero ... 
The preceding indicates that the rebellion is 
spreading very slowly, with the Government hard put 
to find additional troops to control the situation in 
the affected sectors. A strong leader, able to 
control the various groups in Jalisco - Guanajuato-
Colima region - and direct their operations, would 
really set the ball rolling. 21 
The above report is typical of the Military 
Intelligence Division at this time, in that it places 
emphasis on quantification and facts. The focus of this 
particular report was on troop movements and military 
operations, as opposed to any type of in-depth analysis of 
underlying issues. Thus, the American orientation toward 
quantification and facts centered on the activities taking 
place, rather than asking why these developments were 
taking place. 
21G-2 Report: Distribution of Troops - Campaign 
Against Rebels, April 19, 1927; File No. 1483; (UPA 
Microfilm, roll 2, frames 173-175); Mexico, 1919-1941; MID; 
RG 165; NA. 
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MATERIALISM 
Generally speaking, Americans have a bent toward 
materialism and tend to project this value system onto 
other peoples. Addressing the topic of materialism, 
Stewart and Bennett explain that: 
The American stress on material things is 
associated with a belief in the inviolacy of private 
property, a value commonly asserted to be at the 
root of the Constitution and the American conception 
of democracy. The popular assumption that private 
property is inviolate has frequently led to friction 
between Americans and the citizens or bureaucracies 
of other nations, with subsequent repercussions at 
the highest levels of government. U.S. relations 
with Latin American countries have often been 
strained over the issue of private property, and 
danger to property is usually reason enough for 
American intervention or threats to use force. 22 
In 1917 the Military Intelligence Division felt that 
spending money on propaganda was the key to success in 
winning the psychological war against Germany in Mexico. 
This attitude tends to reflect the American orientation 
toward materialism and the use of money as an antidote for 
almost any problem. This materialistic focus of the MID is 
clearly reflected in the following report: 
118. 
We are advised that the Germans and German Agents 
are spending large sums of money on newspaper 
propaganda in Mexico, and though it may have no 
appreciable effect upon the better educated, the 
people are undoubtedly affected by it .... 
It is alleged that we are not carrying on an 
adequate publicity and propaganda campaign, and that 
in Mexico, Americans are continuing friendly with 
the Germans. 
22Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 
We are informed that some American firms are 
soliciting business and even quoting prices to 
Germans of articles on the contraband list. 23 
This report indicates that the MID was concerned with 
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American business behavior in Mexico and blamed the problem 
on the lack of American spending on propaganda. 
The naivete of the Military Intelligence Division is 
reflected in the following comments in which it is assumed 
that a few million dollars would allow the dictating of 
terms to the Mexican government. This particular example 
demonstrates a complete failure to understand the internal 
structure of Mexico, its culture, and the power of 
nationalism. By April 27, 1918, it was being reported that 
"the Mexican Government is financially bankrupt and on the 
verge of complete annihilation." In this same report it 
was suggested that: 
a few million dollars in American or English money 
would do much towards temporarily restoring its 
power, and anyone who could supply this sum would be 
able to dictate what policy the Mexican Government 
should pursue. 24 
This is a typical example of the American mindset toward 
money and its alleged power to solve complex problems. 
The issue of materialism surf aces again in the 
following report concerning the purchase of Lower 
California by the United States. This report was contained 
23Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 2, Weekly 
Summary for November 3, 1917, 20-21. 
24 Ibid., vol. 4, April 27, 1918, 33. 
115 
in the weekly sunnnary for the week ending February 1, 1919: 
The Ashurst resolution and the discussion in the 
United States Senate of the proposal to purchase 
Lower California has naturally attracted much 
attention in Mexico, particularly in the territory 
concerned and along the border. Observers on the 
ground report that a considerable number of Mexicans 
and ranchers of the better class would favor a 
transfer of allegiance, possibly because they have 
lost faith in their own country's ability to 
establish good and stable government, and would be 
willing to come under the authority of the United 
States, in order to enjoy greater security for life 
and property, and, perhaps lower taxes. On the other 
hand, military authorities and the civilian office-
holders, receive the proposal with indignation. 25 
The materialistic theme continues later in the same report 
by mentioning the continued influx of Japanese into Lower 
California for the purpose of agricultural colonizing and 
fishing. In addition, there were proposals for a 
concession to be granted to a Japanese syndicate to provide 
steamship service for Japanese-Mexican trade that could 
undercut the Americans. 26 This was significant because of 
the possible commercial competition from the Japanese. 
The above report offers an interesting look at the 
attitudes of the MID from a materialistic perspective. We 
see that particular individuals (Mexicans and ranchers of 
the better class) are looked upon favorably because of 
their desire for materialism and property (life, property, 
and lower taxes) . These Mexican elites are alleged to 
transcend nationalistic tendencies in favor of class 
25Ibid., vol. 6, February 1, 1919, 520. 
26 Ibid. I 521. 
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interests and an international outlook. The next group of 
individuals {military authorities and civilian office-
holders) are looked down upon because they seem to reject 
the materialistic possibilities offered by the United 
States {received the proposal with indignation) . In the 
same vein, the report sounds the alarm against the possible 
commercial threat from the Japanese who could be moving in 
to undercut the Americans. 
The following report addresses the issue of 
materialism from the perspective of property losses due to 
rebel activity. In this particular report, the writer 
assigns blame for rebel atrocities to the leaders of the 
present government: 
The leaders of the present Government in their 
revolution against Huerta taught the people how to 
sack cities, loot ranches, destroy property and 
dynamite trains, killing innocent travellers. These 
people have proven themselves apt pupils; so much so 
that now it is almost impossible to stop them. To my 
knowledge they offered the soldiers the loot of towns 
to induce them to take them. This is a terrible 
instance of "Curses coming home to roost. "27 
It appears that the gravest concern of the 
intelligence source quoted above is the threat posed to the 
safety of property, rather than lives. Another interesting 
assumption made in this report is that the possibility of 
monetary reward is the driving force behind rebel activity, 
as opposed to other considerations {i.e. political 
ideology, survival, or revenge). 
27 Ibid . , vo 1 . 7 , May 3 , 1919 , 8 5 7 . 
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ACHIEVEMENT AND COMPETITION 
Describing the American orientation for achievement, 
Stewart and Bennett remark that "achievement is given a 
material meaning, which leads to an emphasis on technology 
and on publicity - making accomplishments measurable and 
visible. 112s 
In regards to competition, Stewart and Bennett 
explain that: 
Competition is the primary method among Americans 
for motivating members of groups. Americans, with 
their orientation toward individualism and 
achievement, respond well to this technique. But 
when a competitive approach is applied to members 
of another culture who do not hold the same values, 
the effort may be ineffective at best and may 
produce undesirable consequences. 29 
The issue of achievement and competition, or the lack 
thereof, is reflected in the following report. A daily 
intelligence summary for December 31, 1918, reported the 
following: 
An experienced observer, after a residence of two 
years in Mexico City, writes: "Under present 
conditions there never will be order in the Republic, 
for the military leaders would lose their means of 
gaining a livelihood. The Carrancista generals get a 
shipment of ammunition from the government, sell part 
of it to the rebels at good prices, arrange for a bit 
of a skirmish, (regarding which they make glowing 
reports), draw more supplies for those reported 
destroyed in the fight, then wait for a chance to 
draw more ammunition and repeat the performance. 
There must be, it seems to me, some sort of outside 
28Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 78. 
29 Ibid. I 79. 
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aid; if not military intervention, then economic. 1130 
The observer quoted above was correct in describing 
the "objective" situation that was taking place between the 
federal army and the rebels, but he failed to notice or 
appreciate the "ritual" that was taking place. For 
centuries, the central government in Mexico City (whether 
Indian, Spanish, or Mexican) had never been able to 
completely subdue or control the entire country. Likewise, 
the regions had never been totally successful in pressing 
their demands upon Mexico City. Consequently, there was a 
constant ebb and flow between Mexico City and the regions. 
This ebb and flow dynamic was played out through the 
manifestation of encounters between the federal army and 
the rebels. No amount of intervention would alter this 
type of reality from continuing in the future, nor would 
the contending parties be motivated by competitive 
incentives. 
During the year 1925, a series of memorandums were 
generated within the Military Intelligence Division 
discussing the subject of U.S.-Mexican relations. These 
memorandums provide a clue about the working relationship 
or competition between the MID and the State Department, as 
evidenced by the following comment: "Secretary Kellogg's 
statement to the press of the 12th instant concerning the 
3°Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 29, Daily 
Summary for December 31, 1918, 292. 
relations of the United States and Mexico, came as a 
complete surprise to G-2. 1131 The memo goes on to state: 
The developments in the international situation 
during this short period, resulting in Secretary 
Kellogg's pronouncement of the 12th instant, 
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is believed without precedent in the relations of 
the United States with Mexico, and so far as can be 
determined were not due to any notable change in 
Mexican conditions during that time, but rather to 
a very marked change of public policy on the part 
of the United States. 
This very radical change in policy toward Mexico, 
and the public manner of its promulgation, has 
beyond doubt mystified the American people as to 
its portent and the basic reasons therefor; .... 
The reaction of other Latin American countries 
to this pronounced change of attitude and method 
toward Mexico by the United States will be watched 
with interest. 32 
The above conunents point out that the bureaucratic 
competition and infighting between the MID and the State 
Department resulted in a policy change by the United States 
toward Mexico that completely caught the MID off guard. 
Actually, it was the MID, not just the American people, who 
were "mystified" by the "very radical change in policy" and 
by the "public manner of its promulgation." 
FUTURE ORIENTATION 
Time orientation varies according to culture. 
31Memo: U.S. Policy and the Mexican Situation, June 
23, 1925; File No. G-2/2657-G-569; (UPA Microfilm, roll 1, 
frames 742-748); Mexico, 1919-1941; MID; RG 165; NA. This 
memo was sent by Major J.J. Burleigh, Chief of Military 




According to Stewart and Bennett: 
People orient themselves and direct their actions 
according to where their culture places emphasis 
along the continuum of time orientations. For 
example, orientation to the present is characteristic 
in Latin Americans. In other societies, people are 
oriented to the past and consequently turn to 
traditions for guidance. The most abstract temporal 
orientation is toward the future - the dominant 
American value. 33 
This American orientation "toward the discernible future 
and the high value placed on action yield the principle 
that one can improve upon the present. 1134 
The following report provides an example of the 
optimistic American orientation for the future. The 
Military Intelligence Division, in its optimistic fashion, 
made the following comments regarding the relationship 
between the United States and Mexico: 
Recent reports from various parts of Mexico agree 
in noting an improved feeling toward the United 
States, and a decline of German influence. Among the 
factors mentioned as contributing to this change are 
President Wilson's address of June 6th to the Mexican 
editors, his address of July 4th, the order of July 
10th lifting the embargo on corn and other 
commodities in favor of Mexico, our successes in the 
field in France, the revelation of our ever 
increasing military power, and lastly, the visible 
demonstration of Mexico's present economic dependence 
on us by the operation of the "Trading with the Enemy 
Act" (black list) against individuals resident in 
Mexico. 35 
During 1920 the Military Intelligence Division began 
33Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 74. 
34 Ibid., 75. 
35Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 4, Weekly 
Summary for August 3, 1918, 27. 
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to include a section on "Future Possibilities" within their 
weekly intelligence summaries. For the week ending May 15, 
1920, it was reported: 
From an economic standpoint the immediate effects 
of the revolution will be disastrous. Credit 
operations will be suspended, money and goods will be 
hoarded and all new projects will be held in abeyance 
until public confidence is restored and the economic 
policy of the new government clearly defined. It is 
fortunate that the currency is on a metallic basis. 
However, silver and gold will be hoarded, rendering 
business transactions even more difficult. Even if 
political events take a more favorable turn than it 
is reasonable to expect, conditions will be upset for 
months. If the revolution degenerates into a fight 
for power between military chiefs a reversion to the 
anarchical conditions prevailing in 1915 will 
follow. 36 
The above report is a good example of the American 
temporal orientation toward the future, as opposed to the 
characteristic Latin American orientation to the past and 
present. In this report, future is understood as near 
future: of a few months, not years (short-term time 
cycles) . 
The following weekly summary from 1925 provides an 
update on the improving conditions in Mexico, at least in 
regards to American interests. It also attempts to look 
optimistically toward the future. Several excerpts are 
provided: 
While.the situation in Mexico is not clearly 
defined, and the future can not be viewed with any 
measure of assurance, in certain respects improvement 
can be noted. 
During the months which have intervened since 
36Ibid., vol. 13, May 15, 1920, 3660-3661. 
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Secretary Kellogg informed the public of the 
unsatisfactory conditions obtaining with reference to 
American interests in Mexico, the tension has relaxed 
sufficiently to permit conciliatory efforts to be 
directed toward the settlement of several cases 
involving American interests ... 
There is also a disposition on the part of 
Government officials to hold in check the restless 
labor elements, and to avoid where possible further 
difficulties of this nature ... 
The trend of events generally has been toward 
removing as many as possible of the causes of 
complaint against the Mexican Government, before the 
return of Ambassador Sheffield to his post at Mexico 
C
l 37 1ty ... 
At issue in the above report is the regaining of 
recognition of Mexico by the United States. The MID 
focused on the future impact that these improvements would 
have on American interests, as opposed to the long-term 
effect upon Mexico or how American interests might impact 
Mexico. It is interesting to note that this report does 
not address the issues surrounding the "restless labor 
elements," even though American businesses relied on 
Mexican labor. 
INDIVIDUALISM 
The theme of rugged individualism is quite persuasive 
throughout the history of the United States. Stewart and 
Bennett define individualism as "the perception of the self 
as the cultural quantum in society." They explain that 
"the self acts as the operational unit in action and as the 
37 Ibid., vol. 24, September 19 to October 2, 1925, 
10843-10845. 
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locus of control for behavior. "38 However, the individual 
does not operate entirely without restraint. Stewart and 
Bennett argue that: 
Social control and even a form of social coercion 
are found in the nebulous but imperative 
expectation that the individual will choose as 
everyone else wants him or her to. 39 
A classic case of the individual being pressured to 
conform is presented below. A Military Intelligence 
Division memorandum prepared for the Chief of Staff 
regarding the activities in Mexico of a Colonel James A. 
Ryan, USA, Retired, stated: "What action should be taken 
in regard to the alleged questionable activities in Mexico 
of Colonel James A. Ryan, U.S. Army, retired." Apparently, 
Colonel Ryan retired in 1919 after thirty years of service. 
Ryan had been detailed as a Military Aide to General 
Obreg6n in 1918 and had developed a personal friendship 
with him. After retiring, Ryan was employed as a lobbyist 
by American business concerns in Mexico. The MID memo 
stated the following: 
134. 
While it is highly probable that Colonel Ryan has 
been and is at the present time engaged in activities 
of a questionable character and inconsistent with his 
status as a retired American Army Officer, there is 
not sufficient evidence at hand to establish this as 
a fact. The allegations contained in the 
accompanying papers cannot be used as evidence in 
38Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 
39Ibid. I 135. 
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their present form. 40 
It is significant to note that the MID was acting upon mere 
"allegations," as opposed to investigating further the 
actual facts of the case. 
The action recommended in this case was that the 
Adjutant General should send a warning letter to Ryan, 
alerting hi~ to stay away from "any participation in 
politics in Mexico." The warning letter was also to state: 
It is not the intention or desire of the war 
Department to interfere with you in the legitimate 
pursuit of any civil activities in which you may be 
interested, but it must be borne in mind that it is 
impossible for an officer of the Army, active or 
retired, to so completely divorce himself from his 
status that his actions in a foreign country, 
especially Mexico, will not be misconstrued if of a 
political character; the continuance of such 
activities whether misconstrued or reprehensible in 
fact can very readily be accepted as having the tacit 
consent of the War Department or even of the 
Government itself. 41 
The above scenario has been played out by other 
military and government officials over the years. In this 
case, it is interesting to note the war Department's 
sensitivity over the fact that this situation was taking 
place in Mexico, as opposed to another country. 
40Memo: Activities in Mexico of Colonel James A. Ryan, 
U.S.A., Retired, December 26, 1923; (UPA Microfilm, roll 1, 
frames 145-157); Mexico, 1919-1941; MID; RG 165; NA. 
41 Ibid. 
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MINDSET OF THE MID 
The term "mindset" is defined here to mean the 
attitudes, perceptions, constructs, and paradigms held by 
the Military Intelligence Division. For example, the MID 
maintained a detached and isolated existence following the 
First World War which served to affect relations with other 
organizations and possibly had a psychological impact upon 
staff: 
This unfortunate feeling of detachment not only 
tended to draw military intelligence further and 
further away from the remainder of the Army but 
also was soon sharply aggravated through the 
adoption of overzealous security policies on the 
part of the G-2 officials. By insisting that 
practically all MID actions, many of which were 
not even remotely connected with confidential 
military intelligence techniques or procedures, 
should be habitually regarded as highly classified, 
these officials rendered their own just cause more 
ultimate harm than good. Besides, after they had 
chosen to surround themselves with such an 
unnecessary aura of mysterious isolation, it became 
almost impossible for any outsider to gauge 
accurately the true worth of the military 
intelligence effort or to comprehend properly its 
legitimate place in the total scheme of national 
defense. 42 
The following report is an attempt by the Military 
Intelligence Division to describe the attitudes of Mexicans 
(by social class) toward the war in Europe: 
we are informed from a reliable source that the 
great mass of the Mexicans are stated to be quite 
unconcerned about the war which affects them little. 
The partially educated class are anti-foreign and 
particularly anti-American. 
42Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 409. 
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The upper class are, in a large majority, pro-Ally, 
though there are among them a great many rabid pro-
Germans. 
It is stated that the propaganda of the pro-German 
Mexicans is very disproportionate to their number, 
and it is believed that a great majority of the 
cultured Mexicans are pro-Ally. 43 
The above report provides some insight into the 
mindset of American military intelligence. First, a 
"reliable source," without mention of expertise or 
credentials, provided some generalizations and opinions 
about the attitudes of Mexicans toward the war in Europe. 
Second, the information provided by the source is taken as 
fact. And third, social stereotyping of the Mexican people 
is implied by classifying them in terms like: great mass, 
partially educated, upper class, and cultured Mexicans. 
The following report touches on the concern of the 
Military Intelligence Division toward relations between the 
United States and Mexico, especially in the military arena: 
Recent reports to hand indicate that Mexico will in 
the future give little trouble to the United States, 
owing to the fact that it is so greatly impressed by 
the extent of our military preparation. 
There may be internal troubles, but there will be 
no united action against this country. 44 
The above report is a good example of the MID 
emphasis and focus on external or foreign affairs, as 
opposed to the internal situation in Mexico. In addition, 
it assumes an air of superiority, smugness, and arrogance 
43Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 1, Weekly 
Summary for June 30, 1917, 16-17. 
44 Ibid., September 15, 1917, 24. 
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toward Mexico concerning the "fact" that Mexico is "so 
greatly impressed" with U.S. military capability and would 
not consider actions against the U.S. on that basis alone. 
The MID did not consider the possibility that Mexico might 
have other reasons, concerns, interests, and historical 
perspectives that would mitigate against the possibility of 
Mexican military action against the United States. 
The following article from the New York Times 
provides an interesting perspective on the issue of 
American intervention in Mexico. This particular article 
was also picked up by military intelligence and included in 
the weekly summary, as it discusses the border perspective 
on the issue of intervention: 
Taking notes on the Texas side of the border, a 
correspondent of the New York Times, who has 
interviewed men of many callings, learns that war 
with Mexico is not desired by any community nor by 
any person whose opinion is worth recording; that, in 
fact, there is practical unanimity for a peaceful 
settlement of differences with Mexico. If the people 
of border States can live as neighbors with the 
Mexicans without demanding intervention, there is no 
reason why the people of the other forty-five States 
should get excited, advocate war, and declare for 
occupation. The border sentiment, the border 
judgment, point to the true solution. What may be 
called firm reasonableness should be the policy of 
the Government at Washington. While supporting 
American rights, it should be fair to the Mexicans 
and considerate of their real interests. 45 
Although the above article was not written by MID 
personnel, it is interesting because of the contradictions 
that it presents which tend to reflect the approach taken 
45Ibid., vol. 11, January 24, 1920, 2871. 
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by the MID, as well as representing the MID mindset. 
First, it talks about how the people of the border states 
get along with their Mexican neighbors, but fails to 
mention the numerous vigilante actions taken against 
Mexicans living along the border. Second, the article 
fails to mention the numerous border incidents involving 
violence or threats of violence that had taken place over 
the years. Third, there is no reference to the many calls 
for intervention by the various governors of border states 
over the years. Fourth, the sources for this article 
included only those people "whose opinion is worth 
recording." There appears to be a glaring lack of Mexican 
sources and a complete failure to appreciate or understand 
the Mexican perspective. And finally, the correspondent 
tried to quantify his results by "taking notes" and 
interviewing men "of many callings." 
After a number of years, international relations in 
Mexico had taken another turn. This time the Military 
Intelligence Division analyzed Article 27 of the Mexican 
constitution to assess its negative impact upon the United 
States. The following comments come from a 1926 weekly 
summary: 
Once more the Mexican Government appears about to 
sacrifice cordial international relations, in order 
to further the economic and social reforms embodied 
in her program of domestic administration. 
The reform principles have been the source of 
international friction almost continuously since 
their embodiment in the Constitution of 1917 ... 
Now, at length, in the recent enactment of the land 
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and petroleum laws, regulating a part of Article 27, 
infringement of the vested rights of foreigners seems 
virtually certain, if the measures are made effective 
in their present form. The American Government, 
therefore, has made formal representation to the 
Mexican Government against certain features of these 
laws, and similar action is reported to have been 
taken by Great Britain ... 
The question of importance involved in the present 
situation is: Will the trend of the immediate future 
in Mexico be toward carrying out the radical policies 
predicated on these two laws and others of a similar 
nature, or will there be a conservative reaction in 
the administration attended by modification of the 
provisions to which the American Government has found 
objection ? 46 
The above report provides insight to the MID mindset 
from several angles. First, the MID is concerned strictly 
about the possible implementation of Article 27 and how 
that would impact American interests. No mention is made 
about Mexican interests nor Mexican rights in this 
situation. Second, sole blame for disrupting "cordial" 
international relations is laid at the feet of Mexico. No 
mention is made of the internal economic and social 
conditions existing in Mexico which might have a bearing on 
the situation. Third, the American government is 
strengthened in its position because Great Britain is also 
protesting against the implementation of Article 27. There 
is not the slightest hint nor acknowledgment that the 
United States and Great Britain are involved in 
imperialistic actions. And finally, the MID position is 
centered on the immediate future, as opposed to any kind of 
46 Ibid., vol. 25, January 9-22, 1926, 10986-10988. 
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analysis of the long-term future. 
ETHNOCENTRISM 
Stewart and Bennett define ethnocentrism as 
"centrality of culture. "47 Ethnocentrism tends to create a 
number of problems and implications when encountering 
cultural differences, as the Military Intelligence Division 
did in Mexico. Stewart and Bennett describe the 
implications for those with an ethnocentric world view: 
First, ethnocentric beliefs about one's own culture 
shape a social sense of identity which is narrow and 
defensive. Second, ethnocentrism normally involves 
the perception of members of other cultures in terms 
of stereotypes. Third, the dynamic of ethnocentrism 
is such that comparative judgments are made between 
one's own culture and other cultures under the 
assumption that one's own is normal and natural. As 
a consequence, ethnocentric judgments usually involve 
invidious comparisons that ennoble one's own culture 
while degrading those of others. 48 
The following intelligence report provides a glimpse 
of the ethnocentric approach of the Military Intelligence 
Division. In this case, "one of our Consuls in Lower 
California" provided the intelligence data. The consul 
reported on the issue of U.S. intervention in Mexico: 
161. 
Mexicans in Lower California believe that 
intervention by the United States in the affairs of 
Mexico is imminent. Governor Cantu has issued orders 
for disposition of his military forces with a view to 
appropriate action in case of intervention. The 
small detachments are to be so disposed that there 
47Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 
48 Ibid · 
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will be no collision between them and United States 
troops and so that after a few days they may 
capitulate without firing a shot. In a moving 
picture show on July 4th pictures of a German General 
and his staff were lustily applauded by the Mexican 
audience, whereupon one of Governor Cantu's 
confidential secretaries arose and severely 
reproached the audience, reminding them that the 
Americans were the friends of the Mexicans and the 
only friends they had in the world. 49 
In the above example, we see an American consul using 
subtle language to cover his stereotypical descriptions of 
Mexican people as being sensual (lustily applauded) and 
childlike (severely reproached the audience) . The consul 
describes how the Mexican troops would be deployed in order 
to avoid confrontation with U.S. troops, but he does not 
offer any explanation for the motivation behind this 
behavior. The consul does not attempt to describe the 
existing conditions in Lower California which might provide 
some insight into the internal situation of the region. 
The following excerpts are drawn from a Special 
Feature Section for "A Review of the Mexican Situation as 
it Exists Today," contained within a 1921 weekly summary 
report: 
Yet one who has made a close study of the Mexican 
situation cannot be misled by these several material 
improvements. It must be realized that during the 
past seventy years of Mexican political life, as many 
governments have come and gone, the causes of which 
rest in the very psychology of the Mexican people. 
As an individual, the Mexican has absolutely no 
conception of abstract principle. The issue at hand 
must be concretely represented in order to apply to 
49Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 9, Weekly 
Summary for August 9, 1919, 1496. 
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him. The average Mexican follows an individual and 
is not led by the principle of patriotism. Primarily 
in political faith he is not a Mexican, but rather an 
Obregonista, a Carrancista, or some other "ista." 
The national idea is always submerged in the man of 
the hour. The health of one man makes all the 
difference in Mexican affairs. The old satire, used 
by the Mexican himself, "Come get your gun and let's 
vote," is a commentary on the political idea of the 
Mexican. 50 
The above political commentary is a good example of 
the American perspective or orientation of superiority over 
other cultures and races. A number of causes are given for 
the problems being encountered in Mexico: the psychology 
of the Mexican people is to blame for the instability of 
their governments; the Mexican is portrayed as being 
incapable of abstract thinking; and Mexicans are considered 
to be incapable of patriotism and nationalism. 
Major E.L.N. Glass, Assistant Military Attache in 
Mexico City, submitted a report of travel early in 1924. 
He traveled from Mexico City to Tampico, Tamaulipas, then 
to San Antonio, Texas, and back. Although the focus of the 
report is on rebel military activities, Glass does touch 
upon the subject of "public sentiment." According to 
Glass: 
Public sentiment in Tampico is all pro-rebel. 
Taxation burdens imposed by the Federal Gov't. have 
served to alienate all support from the merchant 
class, while the inability of the Federal Gov't. to 
extend military protection to the oil companies has 
worked to make these pro-rebel. The greatest factor, 
however, working to spread the pro-rebel doctrine is 
the attitude of the United States in taking part, (at 
50 Ibid. , vol. 1 7, April 9, 1921, 7652. 
least, according to the sensitive Mexican mind it 
appears that the U.S. is meddling) in the present 
revolution. 
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Should the rebels win, the penalties to be suffered 
by American companies are liable to be heavy. 51 
The above report is indicative of the MID fascination 
with connecting public attitudes (pro-rebel) to various 
external facts (taxes, lack of military protection, and 
U.S. actions), without exploring other possibilities. In 
addition, this report uses the euphemism "sensitive Mexican 
mind" to cover racist, or at least condescending, attitudes 
toward the Mexican perspective regarding U.S. involvement 
in Mexico. 
An assessment of the political situation in Mexico 
was made by Lieut. Colonel Edward Davis, Military Attache 
in Mexico City, after the congressional elections of 1926. 
Davis observes that the elections were "marked by 
indifference" as evidenced by the fact that "there was much 
less disorder than usual and a smaller number of political 
murders." He goes on to say: 
There was, of course, no expression of the public 
will, in this election, for, as is well known by all 
who know Mexico, many generations must pass before 
elections in Mexico can possibly express the public 
will. 52 
The above report is a good example of how U.S. 
51Report: Travel to Pro-Rebel Tampico, January 25, 
1924; File No. 4418; (UPA Microfilm, roll 1, frames 285-
286); Mexico, 1919-1941; MID; RG 165; NA. 
52G-2 Report: Congressional Elections, July 9, 1926; 
File No. 2657-G-622; (UPA Microfilm, roll 3, frame 128); 
Mexico, 1919-1941; MID; RG 165; NA. 
observers in Mexico attempted to compare the political 
election process between the United States and Mexico. 
Davis takes a condescending attitude toward Mexican 
politics, especially in regard to measuring the "public 
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will" and suggesting that it would take "many generations" 
before this could occur. This report implies that the term 
"election" means the same thing in Mexico as it does in the 
United States. 
The following remarks concern a confidential analysis 
of the Mexican army contained in a weekly summary for 1927. 
The analysis was brief in length (8 pages), but 
comprehensive in scope, covering a wide variety of topics 
(history, policy, personnel, training, tactics, etc.). For 
the most part, the analysis was objective, but cryptic 
comments can still be found. Speaking on the topic of 
military policy, the report read: 
Mexico cannot hope to assume successfully an 
aggressive attitude toward the United States nor be 
permitted by the latter to give effect to any such 
attitude against her weaker southern neighbors. 53 
In regards to the topic of personnel the following remarks 
were made: 
The officers of the "Old Army" under Diaz were well 
educated and possessed some social refinement ... 
The present personnel were inherited from the 
revolutionary period, ... the lack of even a fair 
academic education, which applies to the great 
majority, is naturally restrictive of any real grasp 
of the higher military knowledge that is essential ... 
53Challener, Military Intelligence, vol. 26, Weekly 
Summary for August 6-19, 1927, 2. 
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The Mexican soldier is merely an Indian recruited 
from the lowest and roughest classes of the country 
and therefore, as may be expected, takes no great 
interest or pride in his personal appearance, his 
carriage, or his dress; nor does he show any greater 
interest or pride in the care of his arms and 
equipment. s4 
The following comments were made regarding the topic of 
training and morale: 
The professional deficiencies of the officers, 
general neglect of modern field training, defects of 
racial origin and social conditions at large combine 
to give a low ratio of fighting value .... In no sense 
is it trained or otherwise prepared for combat 
operations against well trained troops.ss 
The above excerpts are interesting from several 
perspectives. First, the Military Intelligence Division is 
concerned about national security and makes a logical 
comparison between U.S. and Mexican forces, while 
attempting to assess the potential threat against the 
United States. Obviously, the MID indicates that the 
Mexican army is no match for the superior U.S. army. It is 
ironic that the quality and effectiveness of U.S. military 
forces were being criticized in the United States at this 
same time because of downsizing and neglect. Second, a 
comparison is made between the "Old Army" under D:laz and 
the current revolutionary forces, with a favorable nod 
going to the old army because of education and social 
refinement. Yet the reality was that the old army was 
s4Ibid., 5. 
55Ibid. I 7. 
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ineffective in putting down the rebellion in the first 
place. Third, racial bias is evident in describing the 
Mexican soldier as "merely an Indian" and that the fighting 
value of the army is low, due to "defects of racial 
origin," among other factors. 
SUMMARY 
The textual analysis of this chapter brings to light 
the fact that the Military Intelligence Division was 
deficient in its analysis of Mexico. In spite of the 
evidence at hand, erroneous conclusions were drawn. 
Several factors were involved in this state of affairs. 
First, the MID assumed that the "facts" would speak for 
themselves. The problem was that the facts were not placed 
into context, nor were they interpreted. Instead, the MID 
focused on quantifiable, tangible situations. Second, the 
MID did not reconcile the contradictions, nor debate the 
ambiguities that were evident in the vast store of 
information supplied to them. Third, by failing to deal 
with the gray areas of Mexico, a black and white picture of 
the Mexican Revolution emerged that was not related to 
reality. And finally, the MID did not ask the right 
questions that might lead to developing a different picture 
of Mexico. Similar to what would happen in Vietnam years 




The history of the Military Intelligence Division is 
very much intertwined with the history of the relations 
between Mexico and the United States. The MID's 
involvement in Mexico both predates and postdates the 
period of time analyzed by this study. Throughout the ten 
years of this study, 1917-1927, we see a number of 
recurring themes relating to the surveillance of Mexico by 
U.S. military intelligence. 
One theme seen throughout this study is the lack of 
quality intelligence analysis or production. Although 
there was a great deal of raw data and information 
collected from the field, the actual processing or analysis 
of the data left something to be desired. On the eve of 
World War One, much of the information sent to Washington 
did not find its way into War Department files. The 
official historian for the Military Intelligence Division 
even admitted that the status of the agency was worse than 
dismal. The rapid and unplanned expansion of the MID 
during the war led to a great deal of confusion and 
inefficiency in the handling of intelligence analysis. 
After the war, downsizing of the central staff and 
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insufficient resources led to the curtailment or reduction 
of intelligence functions. The value or the quality of the 
intelligence that was actually produced (quality of 
writing, detailed observations, insight, etc.) did not 
always demonstrate high levels of expertise nor 
professionalism. 
A second theme, which is closely related to the 
first, is the quality of personnel selected for 
intelligence work. Intelligence had a reputation, which 
resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy, for attracting 
officers not wanted for command positions due to the 
question of professional competence. One historian has 
pointed out that: "Regular army officers discovered that 
intelligence was not a viable career field, and according 
to one author, G-2 became a kind of dumping ground for 
incompetents." 1 
Another aspect touching on the personnel theme was 
the problem of compensation for military attaches. Regular 
army pay was not adequate to meet the needs for official 
representation functions, thus, only those with outside 
incomes could realistically serve in these positions. The 
result of course, was that a number of qualified 
individuals with no outside incomes, did not even consider 
1Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The 
Secret Side of American History, (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1990), 113. 
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themselves for these positions. 
A third theme was the emotional hysteria directed 
toward Mexico during this era. During the war, there was 
the fear of German spies and saboteurs crossing into the 
United States from Mexico. Immediately after the war, 
there was the fear of Bolshevists and radicals spreading 
their propaganda into the United States from Mexico. 
Throughout this period, the stability of the Mexican 
government was constantly called into question. There was 
concern that violence emanating from the revolution would 
endanger American business interests in Mexico, or might 
even spread into the United States. 
A final theme is that of the cultural differences 
between Mexico and the United States. Granted, the level 
of awareness of cultural differences is quite distinct 
between then and now. However, the assumptions that the 
MID made concerning Mexico were certainly driven by 
cultural differences and these assumptions did impact the 
way in which intelligence from Mexico was analyzed. Thus, 
the official policy decisions and perspectives of the 
United States regarding Mexico were definitely impacted by 
the way in which military intelligence was generated, 
processed, and analyzed. 
The quantitative analysis portion of this study 
demonstrates that the priorities and attitudes of the 
United States toward Mexico did not really change much 
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during the period of 1917-1927 as a result of the military 
intelligence surveillance of Mexico. The priorities of the 
Military Intelligence Division, as shown by the 
quantitative analysis, remained focused on the monitoring 
and tracking of military forces, rebel activities, actual 
and potential leaders, levels of violence, political 
stability, economic potential, activities along the 
Mexican-u.s. border, and the relationship between Mexico 
and foreign powers, especially Germany and Japan. 
The priorities demonstrated by the Military 
Intelligence Division did not really change because of the 
American cultural orientation, as articulated by Stewart 
and Bennett, toward: action, individual achievement, 
quantification, facts, and materialism. This cultural 
orientation allowed military intelligence to remain focused 
on the monitoring of external military and political 
activities that could be tabulated and considered factual. 
These external activities were a priority because they 
could be used to explain the conditions existing in Mexico 
that might endanger American life or property, thus 
creating the justification for intervention. Since there 
was a great deal of "activity" taking place at this time, 
priorities did not change. 
The Military Intelligence Division clearly followed a 
"doing" and "action" orientation in constructing a 
framework for an analysis of Mexico. This analysis 
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centered on the externals of life. Little attention was 
devoted to describing and understanding the internal 
structure of Mexico or the inner workings of Mexican life 
and culture. Intelligence reports did include information 
about education, religion, customs, and society, but this 
type of information tended to be obscured in ethnocentric 
language and disconnected from the importance attached to 
the bureaucratic world of the military and the political 
state. It is debatable as to whether the Military 
Intelligence Division truly understood the meaning of the 
Mexican Revolution or the Mexican yearning for national 
sovereignty or the Mexican resentment of American 
intervention (in its myriad guises) . 
The textual analysis portion of this study provides a 
demonstration of the problems inherent in cross-cultural 
exchanges. The quality of information contained in many of 
the selected intelligence reports point out the failure of 
the Military Intelligence Division to appreciate the 
cultural differences between Mexico and the United States. 
There are numerous examples of biased, erroneous, or even 
fictional accounts of what was actually taking place in 
Mexico. Part of the problem resided in the integrity of 
the sources themselves. Part of the problem resided in the 
interpretation of that data provided. And finally, part of 
the problem was the fact that the MID failed to ask the 
right questions. 
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The attitudes and assumptions of U.S. government 
officials toward Mexico did not really change during the 
years 1917-1927. A significant reason for this was that 
military intelligence reports, with a cultural bias built 
into them, did not enlighten nor educate American officials 
concerning the reality of Mexico. It appears that there 
was no notion nor understanding on the part of the MID that 
there could be other factors at play (history, culture, 
ritual, race, etc.) that might influence their analysis of 
Mexico. These intelligence reports failed to grasp the 
significance of what was taking place in Mexico. Without 
an accurate intelligence picture of Mexico, American 
officials had no frame of reference on which to base their 
attitudes and actions toward Mexico. 
I would argue that American cultural orientations and 
ethnocentrism hampered the effectiveness and accuracy of 
military intelligence in relation to Mexico. It appears 
that a great deal of time and psychic energy was expended 
by the MID chasing after phantoms in Mexico. 
Unfortunately, no one really questioned whether or not the 
United States had the ability or the right to attempt to 
influence the events taking place in Mexico during the 
years 1917-1927. 
The thesis question raised in this study was whether 
the Mexican reality as viewed through the eyes of the U.S. 
Military Intelligence Division was accurate and complete. 
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Based upon the results of the quantitative analysis and 
textual analysis of this study, I maintain that the Mexican 
reality as viewed through the eyes of the U.S. Military 
Intelligence Division was both inaccurate and incomplete. 
The MID perspective was colored by cultural bias, 
ignorance, and misunderstanding. Basically, the Military 
Intelligence Division failed to grasp the reality of Mexico 
because it failed to ask the right questions. Thus, the 
MID misunderstood the nature of Mexico and its peoples, 
especially in its relationship with the United States. 
IMPLICATIONS 
The three part model of analysis (historical 
overview, quantitative analysis, and textual analysis) 
employed in this study lends itself to the possibility of 
further research in the area of international history and 
cross-cultural studies. Obviously, this study was 
restricted in scope, but larger research projects can be 
undertaken using the same techniques. The use of multiple 
analysis techniques enhances the quality of the study and 
provides for a more comprehensive picture of the various 
factors involved that influenced historical events. 
In his study of culture and international history, 
Akira Iriye states that: 
Nations, like individuals, sometimes use force to 
protect themselves and often engage in selfish 
pursuits to enrich themselves but they also develop 
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visions, dreams, and prejudices about themselves and 
the world that influence their relationships. 2 
It is the myriad "manifestations of human 
consciousness" on a national level that form the basis for 
a cultural approach to international history. 3 As a 
result, this study used a cultural approach to analyze the 
Military Intelligence Division's surveillance of and 
interaction with Mexico. According to Iriye, the cultural 
approach is both fascinating and frustrating because: 
it forces the historian to recognize simultaneously 
qualitative differences among cultural traditions 
and vocabularies and determine whether some universal 
"structures of meaning" {to use Clifford Geertz's 
phrase) might result from direct or indirect contact 
among the representatives of different cultures. 4 
The relationship between Mexico and the United States 
certainly affords ample opportunities for the study of both 
direct and indirect contact between representatives of 
these two cultures. 
Although this study takes a cultural approach to 
analyze the Military Intelligence Division's role in 
Mexico, it must be understood that other factors, such as 
power, economics, and military strategy also played a major 
part in this unique relationship. Edward Said makes clear 
that "ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be 
2Iriye, "Culture and International History," 215. 
3Ibid. I 214. 
4Ibid. I 216. 
145 
understood or studied without their force, or more 
precisely their configurations of power, also being 
studied." 5 Said also points out that the relationship 
"between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of 
domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony." 6 I 
would argue that the relationship between Mexico and the 
United States is similar. In addition to the cultural 
differences, it was the unequal balance of power between 
Mexico and the United States that also influenced the 
attitudes and perceptions of the MID toward Mexico. 
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